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Introduction 
In 2010, Australia's first National Primary Care Strategy (NPCS) was released by the 
Commonwealth Department of Health and Aging (DoHA).1 It was one of a series of 
strategies released as part of the National Health Reform 2010.2 
The NPCS identified the need to address the growing problem of chronic disease generally, 
and diabetes specifically, by improving the coordination, quality and delivery of primary care. 
The research report that informed the strategy identified four main factors: 
… contributing to the gap between optimal and current practice ... (i) the 
method of financing, (ii) the availability of other disciplines to participate in 
team care, (iii) limited engagement with self-management education, and (iv) 
lack of information and decision support systems. 3 (page 68) 
The primary mechanism the NPCS identified to achieve this objective of reducing the gap 
between optimal and current practice was to improve incentives for general practitioners 
(GPs) to "become responsible for managing (patient) care" by developing, organising and 
implementing personalised care plans, including organising access to additional services 
such as those provided by Credentialled Diabetes Educators (CDEs), exercise physiologists, 
dietitians and psychologists.  
A specific initiative was proposed to capture these incentives: the Diabetes Coordinated 
Care Initiative (DCCI). The proposed program included: 
…  a performance framework under which practices will be rewarded if their 
patients’ health improves. GPs will be paid to help patients manage their 
condition over time, and ensure they can access the kind of care they need.1 
(page 32) 
Patients voluntarily enrolling in this program were expected to benefit from having access to 
the services they needed, coordination of their care across multiple providers and support 
for their GP to manage their condition "rather than just treating the presenting conditions". 
There was also an expectation that this initiative would reduce hospitalisations due to 
complications from diabetes.  
The DCCI, proposed by DoHA in June 2010, comprised a fixed capitated payment ($1,200) 
per patient with diabetes per year that was intended to cover both GP services (including 
those not related to diabetes) and AHSs. The payment of either the entire or partial amount 
of the capitation was expected be made directly to the GP. The GP would then have the 
responsibility of allocating these funds to finance the care provided by that general practice, 
including AHSs provided by that practice.  
The proposed payment was a capitation rate, not a capped patient budget, hence there was 
also a possibility that GPs could redistribute the funds across patients who had differential 
needs. For example, if the GP could differentiate between patients with above and below 
average needs, then expenditure on patients with above average needs could be higher 
than that for lower than average needs. Care could be optimized for individual patients while 
total costs remained within the overall budget.  
There was an expectation that AHS use would increase as patient access to and 
compliance with best practice improved. This payment of $1,200 probably represented a 
premium over the average costs of primary care services and AHSs provided to a sample of 
patients with diabetes.4,a
                                               
a  Derived from DiabCo$t4 The report indicates that 12% of the average total direct health care costs 
are due to primary health care costs. The estimated average total cost from all services is $4260 in 
2003 dollars and 12% of this is $511.  
 Therefore, for a GP with a very large and representative sample of 
diabetes patients, the total pool of funds could be expected to cover the costs of care for the 
overall patient group.  
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Additional payments for GPs enrolling patients and for achieving performance benchmarks 
were proposed. The performance benchmarks were not detailed but were expected to 
include the proportion of patients whose HbA1c was controlled and the proportion of 
patients who were hospitalised. 
Despite the extensive evidence base for this policy, the initiative met with significant criticism 
by the GP community. The main criticism was that GPs were unwilling to be fund holders for 
not only the diabetes related MBS services, but those relating to the “broken leg” or, more 
likely, comorbidities such as respiratory disease.  
A survey by the Medical Observer found that only 5% of respondents (GPs) would take up 
the initiative.5 A range of criticisms was made in both the public and private domain.6 These 
criticisms included: 
> The capacity for a GP or general practice to cream skim, that is, enrol only those 
patients whose expected service costs are less than the single fixed capitation. 
> The financial dis-incentive to enrol a patient whose care was complex and also less 
likely to have their key clinical indicators controlled. 
> The requirement for a GP fund holder to be risk bearing, that is, to be able to 
accommodate the risks that some patients’ care costs will be higher than expected. 
> The performance indicator “hospitalisation rate” is subject to small number problems; 
a higher or lower than average hospitalisation rate could be due to chance, not 
performance. 
> If enrolled patients have increased access to AHSs, then patients who were not 
enrolled could have less access to the services provided by this constrained 
workforce. If these unenrolled are also more likely to have complex care needs, then 
there are equity implications also. 
> The use of financial rewards to GPs attributes improved patient outcomes to GPs 
rather than other team members, or patients themselves. 
Our original research proposal was to develop a computer simulation of the proposed DCCI 
for a range of scenarios around patient-GP combinations, and identify strategies to minimise 
the risks and maximise the benefits of the policy. However, just after the funding for this 
research grant was announced, the Health Minister announced that the DCCI would be 
delayed until a Diabetes Coordinated Care Pilot (Diabetes Pilot) was completed and 
evaluated.7 This curtailed the interaction between the research team and decision makers .  
The DCC Pilot was put out to Tender in Early 2011and started in the first quarter of 2012. 
The detailed parameters of this Pilot are not in the public domain; there is no website 
detailing the initiative at the date of this report, January 2012, for example.  
The expected share of the estimated $30M in total funds for the pilot that are allocated to 
services for patients is not in the public domain. The remainder is expected to be allocated 
to the evaluation, the IT structure, training, care coordinators and other overheads. It is 
unclear whether type 1 diabetes patients will be included and whether there will be services 
specifically designed for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. 
A number of other characteristics of the pilot are discussed in the “grey domain”. (They are 
subject of discussion within the health community, particularly in Adelaide, Melbourne and 
Brisbane where the pilot will be implemented.) This discussion generally suggests that the 
pilot will include the following elements: 
> The DCCI had only one classification of patients and one capitation rate, whereas 
the DCC Pilot has at least four classifications with detailed “bundles” of service 
needs for each patient group.  
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> Payments for GPs and practice nurses will be made to the GPs but GPs will not hold 
the funds for allied health service (AHS) providers. 
> There will be centrally employed care coordinators. 
> There will be less reliance on financial incentives in the pay for performance genre, 
compared to the original DCCI.  
The first challenge in this research project was how it could be redesigned given that the 
policy it was intended to research was delayed and the form of its implementation as a Pilot 
was not in the public domain. There was no data to populate the computer simulation. The 
research team’s response to these changing circumstances was to generalise the policy 
intervention and the associated research.  
REVISED RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
First, the key policy issue was generalised from the specific policy initiative of DDC to: ‘ 
> How should the needs of a specific group of patients be addressed within a universal 
health care scheme such as the MBS?  
The term “Tailored Health Care” (THC) is used to describe any initiative that is an alternative 
to expansion of MBS items as a strategy for addressing the needs of patients whose care 
needs are not necessarily met optimally within mainstream primary care. (This issue is 
discussed in more detail in a following section: Policy narrative and policy initiatives) 
Then, the research questions were redefined as:b
1. How can a policy simulation be used to inform any THC style initiative, prospectively? 
 
2. What are the critical elements of an overarching policy framework for THC initiatives for 
Chronic Disease Management (CDM)? 
The rationale for the first research question is that existing methods of policy simulation 
need to be adapted for the primary care policy setting. Methods of policy simulation that 
explicitly accommodate both the “known unknowns” and the available evidence are 
ubiquitous in health technology assessment (HTA). However, computer simulations of 
health technologies are less complex structurally than those of primary care interventions. 
One example of this complexity, and what it means for simulation tools, is the need to 
simulate the interaction between both the patient and GP and a given intervention, not just 
between the patient and the new technology.  
The second question addresses the overarching regulation of a scheme that requires a 
patient to either voluntarily or compulsorily change his or her access to the universal MBS. 
The specific parameters of the DCC Pilot, including the structure of referral processes and 
the exact incentives for GPs, are being developed by a range of stakeholders. The issue of 
interest in this research is whether an overarching regulatory structure is necessary for such 
a scheme and whether the features of such a structure can be specified without access to 
information about the details of the scheme.  
An additional item on the MBS is accommodated within existing regulatory structures. 
Existing THCs, such as injury compensation schemes, cover certain aspects of care for 
eligible patients and are covered by specific regulatory structures. Given that the proposed 
DCCI generates different incentive structures for GPs, including pay for performance, the 
possibility that additional risks that require additional regulation will also result from this 
changed structure cannot be dismissed.  
The overall focus of the research, the development of a policy simulation tool for a chronic 
disease initiative, remains the same. And, as shown in the Conclusion to this report, the 
                                               
b For details of the original research questions, see Appendix 1 “Changes to Research Questions” 
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original research questions were answered using the results of the research on the generic 
policy and methods.  
REPORT STRUCTURE 
The report structure reflects the two imperatives of the research: methodological and policy. 
The eight sections of the report are:  
1. Policy simulation: an introduction to the application of policy simulation using an 
example of an informal application of the methods to the original DCCI policy. 
Method development 
2. Identification of structural uncertainty: a review of the policy narrative and other 
aspects of THC to identify the “known unknowns”. 
3. Model specification: using typologies developed from the policy narrative and focus 
groups to specify the structure of the computer model. 
4. Analysis of the “known unknowns”: a formal analysis of the structural parameters: 
what is the implicit value, what is a plausible alternative value, and does it matter what 
we assume. 
Policy Implications 
5. Risk management strategies: any policy that finances primary care for Medicare 
eligible patients outside the standard Medical Benefits Schedule has structural 
uncertainty (e.g. How will GPs respond to non-MBS financial incentives?)  What are the 
key elements of such an overarching regulatory framework in the case of the DCCI?   
6. Validation: a validation of the process of policy simulation in the context of THC policy.  
7. Results: how does the research inform the two research questions?  
8. Recommendations and conclusions. 
Policy simulation 
A policy simulation is simply a formal modelled simulation of the likely impact of a policy, 
given what we do (and don’t) understand or hypothesise about its mechanisms (and likely 
impact). It can be used prior to the implementation of a policy to identify risks and strategies 
to minimise them. Policy simulation using micro-simulations of complete data sets on, for 
example, Centrelink beneficiaries, and hypothesized responses to changes in well specified 
polices are used in Social Welfare policy formation.c
POLICY SIMULATION IN HEALTH CARE  
 Formal health system policy simulation 
is not used routinely in Australian health services or system research, however, its use is 
increasing. It is however used in Health Technology assessment policy.  
Formal prospective simulation of reimbursement policy is now used routinely in new 
technology adoption in Australia. In the case of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory 
Committee (PBAC), formal simulation of the expected health and cost consequences of the 
decision to reimburse a new drug is essential. These pharmaco-economic simulations are 
informed by the results of clinical trials, other research, and expert opinion. However, key 
strategic decisions can be critically dependent on parameters of unknown value: the “known 
unknowns”. For example, the expected cost effectiveness of a new drug could be sensitive 
to the proportion of patients receiving the drug who have had a history of resistance to an 
older drug; the drug could be more likely to be associated with an adverse event for these 
patients. However, even if the proportion of these patients is unknown, a strategy to 
                                               
c Numerous examples of this kind of policy simulation produced by The National Centre for Social and 
Economic Modelling and the reader is referred to their 
website:http://www.canberra.edu.au/centres/natsem/home 
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minimise prescribing to this group could be implemented. Policy simulation allows the “what 
ifs” of policy to be explored and strategies to manage these “what ifs” to be implemented.  
In contrast to the limited use of formal policy simulation in health system research, informal 
policy simulations are ubiquitous. One example is the imperative to detect cases of 
undiagnosed diabetes in General Practice. Appendix 9 “The ratio of diagnosed to 
undiagnosed cases of diabetes” “presents an example of possible informal analysis of 
“known unknown”. The most recent evidence of the ratio of diagnosed to undiagnosed 
cases of diabetes might not reflect the changes in screening patterns over the last 15 years. 
While not definitive, the evidence presented in Appendix 9 suggests that assuming this ratio 
has changed is a plausible alternative to assuming that, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, the ratio has not changed. 
POLICY SIMULATION VS EVALUATION 
The objective of policy simulation differs from that of program or policy evaluation: the 
former works within available evidence to identify opportunities to improve policy design 
before implementation whereas the latter generates additional evidence to assess the 
selected policy design. For example, policy simulation could identify that, given the current 
policy design, if a particular situation occurs there is likely to be a poor outcome for a 
patient. It can then be used to identify strategies to prevent such patients being enrolled or 
to minimise the risk of poor outcomes should they be enrolled. However, policy simulation 
cannot provide an estimate of the proportion of patients who could be in this situation.  
REPRESENTING POLICY SIMULATION 
Figure 1 represents the process of policy simulation, where the focus is on identification of 
structural uncertainty, the “known unknowns”, in order to develop risk management 
strategies around policy initiatives. A range of sources are used to identify and characterise 
the structural parameters of the policy, including a review of the policy narrative and focus 
groups. The development of the computer model and the resultant risk management 
strategies are informed at each step by these sources.  
Structural parameters and 
their characteristics 
identified from: 
 
Focus groups 
Policy narrative 
Generic model 
Scenarios to avoid 
Policy debate 
→ Identification of structural uncertainty 
 ↓ 
→ Specification of  structural parameters in a computer model 
 ↓ 
→ Analysis of the known unknowns 
 ↓ 
→ Risk management strategies 
↓  ↓ 
 Validation  
Figure 1 Policy simulation  
EXAMPLE OF INFORMAL POLICY SIMULATION 
In the case of the proposed original DCCI, it is possible that the decision by the General 
Practice community to reject the initiative was influenced by GPs’ informal analysis of the 
“known unknowns” (or “what ifs”) rather than questioning the strength of evidence behind 
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the single capitation rate of $1,200 as an estimate of the average cost of care for a person 
with diabetes. 
The policy narrative within which the DCCI was contextualized emphasised the significance 
of changed financial incentives for GPs in facilitating management of the condition rather 
than “treating the presenting problem. The use of a capitation rate to promote flexibility in 
funding was a key mechanism to achieve this outcome. But what should the capitation rate 
be? 
The series of assumptions behind the $1,200 are not in the public domain. It is reasonable 
to assume that the results of the DiabCo$t Study4 informed this estimate. At $1,200 it is also 
likely that it represents a premium over the mean costs of primary care services in one year 
for a patient diagnosed with diabetes. However, the majority of GPs rejected this policy. This 
rejection occurred despite the capacity for a general practice clinic with a large number of 
representative patients to cover the costs of primary care for these patients, and probably 
have an additional premium (profit) compared to care under existing financing structures. 
An informal policy simulation can be used to explore this issue. The implicit assumptions in 
this policy include that:  
1. GPs would not choose to enrol primarily a group of patients whose expected costs of 
care were significantly below this capitation rate (cream-skimming); and  
2. GPs who enrolled all of their patients would be able to accommodate the risks of 
variability in patient costs.  
Implicit assumption 1 – no cream-skimming by GPs 
In relation to the first assumption, GPs’ incentive to cream-skim increases as: i) the gap 
between the expected costs of care for a low risk patient and the capitation rate increases; 
and ii) the ability to accurately identify low cost patients increases. Consider two types of low 
risk patients, both of whom have a capitation fee of $1,200 paid to the GP. The incentive to 
cream skim is higher (the expected profit is higher) for the second of the following patient 
types: 
1. Patients with an expected cost of care of $700 and who can be recognised 
(distinguished from patients with expected costs of care>$1,200) with 80% accuracy. 
2. Patients with an expected cost of $250 and can be recognised with near certainty.  
There is no evidence Australian GPs cream skim, probably because the opportunities to 
cream skim within the current MBS structure are limited. In the absence of evidence, it could 
be reasonable to assume that no GPs will cream-skim under the new system. However, it is 
plausible that there are clinics that will cream-skim. The incentive to cream-skim is highest 
when there is a single capitation rate for a group of patients that are heterogeneous in terms 
of their expected costs and the group with lower than average cost can be identified with 
some certainty. The proposed DCC Initiative meets these conditions.  
Implicit assumption 2 – GPs are willing to be risk bearing 
For the GPs who choose to enrol all of their diabetes patients, regardless of whether their 
expected costs are under or over the capitation rate, there two additional issues. First, there 
is a question of whether a GP can bear the risk associated with outlier patients. Second, 
there is the problem that some GPs, particularly those with a special interest in diabetes, 
could have a higher than average share of more complex patients. In this case the expected 
mean costs of their patients would be higher than $1,200. In both cases, a GP choosing not 
to cream skim (enrol all patients not just profitable patients) might not take on the initiative 
(unwilling to bear the risks).  
In fact a closer review of the DiabCo$t study suggests that it is plausible that: 
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1. less complex (lower risk and lower cost) patients can be distinguished from more 
complex patients prior to enrolment;  
2. lower cost patients are likely to have a significantly lower cost of care compared to the 
average patient;  
3. there are outliers that will lead to GPs who enrol less than 100 patients (for example) to 
bear financial risks; and  
4. a GP with a special interest in more complex patients with diabetes could have a higher 
average cost per patient compared to average costs of diabetes patients overall.  
The 67% of respondents to the DiabCo$t Study who reported no complications had a mean 
of 9.5 GP visits to the surgery, with a standard deviation of 10.2. The corresponding figures 
for those who reported a complication were 14.4 and 16.7. The high standard deviation 
suggests the possibility of outliers, and the distinct bi-modal nature of the distribution of 
costs across patients suggests that there are identifiable groups with different average 
costs. And finally, a higher average cost for complex patients suggest that GPs currently 
providing care to more complex patients will be disadvantaged financially relative to those 
GPs who enrol predominately less complex patients.  
Risk management strategies 
Two possible risk management strategies are associated with this informal analysis of the 
implicit assumptions:  
1. developing multiple capitation rates by differentiating on the basis of patient 
characteristics such as previous complication; and  
2. removing some of the effect of outliers by removing the non-diabetes related costs. 
The DCC Pilot addressed the heterogeneity in the cost of providing best care for patients of 
varying needs and complexity by proposing multiple capitation rates. It also removed the 
outlier effect of small high cost events by only covering diabetes related care; what was 
missing in the original policy proposal was addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
A formal policy simulation builds on the principles of: 
> reviewing the policy (or policy narrative in this case because the details of the policy 
were not released) to see what it omits,  
> identification of the “known unknowns”,  
> and an analyses of these known unknowns” to identify the implicit assumptions and 
plausible alternatives to these assumptions.  
Risk management strategies can then be identified.  
The important point is that the implicit policy assumptions that were omitted from the policy 
narrative can be derived by applying reasoning in the absence of evidence. Aspects of this 
process were performed informally and the pilot included the two changes to manage the 
risks of cream skimming and risk bearing. In this research we extend this informal approach 
to a formal approach and hence identify further omissions from the policy narrative and 
strategies to reduce the associated risks 
 
Identification of structural uncertainty 
The policy simulation presented in this research is unusual in that there are almost no 
parameters of known value, for example, there is no statement on the estimated effect size 
(capacity for patients to benefit) from the DCCI. Furthermore, there are no formal generic 
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policy simulations in the Australian primary health care setting to provide a template from 
which “known unknowns” can be identified. This is in contrast to the state of play in HTA. 
Hence, we start with a generic HTA model, with which we identify a set of core parameters 
for simulating health policies. We use information from the policy narrative, focus groups and 
informal discussions with stakeholders to identify whether these parameters are “known or 
unknown knowns”. Then we summarise the information to identify structural parameters and 
the relationships between these them: known and unknown.  
GENERIC HTA MODEL 
An example of a generic health policy model can be inferred from an HTA, such as those 
used by drug companies in their submissions to the PBAC in support of a decision to 
reimburse their new drug. Effectively, the policy of reimbursement is simulated in a 
pharmaco-economic model.8 The outcome of such a model is the incremental cost and 
effect of the policy, compared to existing policy (the drug is not reimbursed).  
Models used in HTA have the following generic form:  
1. Evidence of cost and effect for each option: The effect and costs of care under usual 
care and the proposed alternative (e.g. an existing and an alternative drug). 
2. Evidence of comparative cost and effect: The incremental effect and cost of changed 
care (the difference between the effect under each technology, and the cost). The 
comparative or incremental effect is the capacity for a patient to benefit from the 
technology compared to usual care.  
Comparative effect is a measure of the expected capacity of a patient to benefit 
from the new drug compared to an existing drug.  
3. Heterogeneity: Identification of patient groups for whom the incremental cost or effect of 
the new technology will or is expected to differ. For example, differential analysis of 
metastatic or adjuvant patients who are currently receiving chemotherapy for breast 
cancer. 
a. Factors that influence the incremental cost and effect: 
b. Factors that influence the variability in incremental cost and effect across patient 
groups 
This step identifies patients with differing capacities to benefit (CtB) from the new 
technology. 
4. Sensitivity analysis: A test of the robustness of the model’s outputs to assumptions 
made in the model.  
5. Key metric: Incremental cost effectiveness ratio (the incremental cost divided by the 
incremental benefit) 
Three structural parameters for DDCI were identified by applying this generic structure to the 
policy. These guide the broader review: 
> the MBS financing structure provides incentives to treat the presenting problem 
rather than manage the chronic condition; 
> Heterogeneity across patients in their response to (CtB from) a given intervention 
where this heterogeneity is the result of different characteristics of patients such as 
comorbidities, socio-economic characteristics, health literacy and language.  
o In other words: different patients will have a different benefit (improved health) 
from this policy. 
> Heterogeneity across a given type of patient, in terms of the intervention they 
receive, where this heterogeneity is a consequence of factors such as variability in 
type of care provided by GPs, and access to AHSs in a given region. 
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o In other words: similar patients will have a different benefit (improved health) 
from this policy, depending upon where they are located, the availability of AHSs 
and the type of GP they have. 
> Opportunity for strategic behaviour by a GP as a consequence of the financial 
incentive to enrol a patient. 
o In other words: GPs have an incentive to encourage enrolment by patients for 
whom there is an additional profit compared to the provision of existing care and 
discourage enrolment for those for whom there is a loss, regardless of that 
patient’s CtB from enrolment. 
> The interactions between these three factors 
A detailed discussion of the rationale for selecting these three factors is included in 
Appendix 3. 
FOCUS GROUPS  
The role of focus groups in this policy simulation is to identify the “players” in the applied 
economic model (the computer simulation), the range of “types” of each player and the 
range of contexts in which they will interact. The summary of five patient stories are 
presented below and the characteristics of these stories that influenced the model structure 
are highlighted. A summary of participants is presented in Appendix 3 and a summary of the 
themes raised is presented in Appendix 4.  
DH’s Story 
DH is a male in his 50’s. He was diagnosed with diabetes approx. 10 years ago. He stated 
that it was difficult to separate issue of diabetes from general men’s health issues 
acknowledging men do not often take pro-active measures to deal with their health. He 
indicated there was a lot of focus of GP’s on changing behaviour based on fear, not on 
wellness. He said it is a lonely journey having diabetes as you live with it constantly and the 
idea of diabetes being a lifelong disease and maybe incurable is daunting. But at the same 
time you do not want to hear other people’s horror stories. He also noted that there are no 
men’s health groups dealing with diabetes. 
DH’s treatment is primarily by way of medication and he has made attempts to change his 
lifestyle. He told the story of making a request for a dietitian to visit his home and review 
food cupboard to advise on sorts of food to avoid and those to have. They would not do this, 
but instead they just hand out brochures and they just don’t have any idea of your life. He 
noted that while diabetes is about lifestyle, dietitians and GP’s stop short of understanding 
people’s lifestyles. 
He indicated that he was seeing a GP but he was referred onto specialist; he washed his 
hands of him noting his care factor as “zero”. He has recently moved from 1 specialist to 
another – seeing a younger more progressive specialist who has really gotten a better hold 
of his condition and treating more effectively. DH said from his experience “GP’s are not 
leaders in change of improved management and treatment of diabetes”. 
CG’s story 
CG is an Aboriginal man in his 30’s. He has what he refers to as “borderline” diabetes. He 
was diagnosed 10 years ago and takes medication but he is more concerned about issues 
he has with his heart. CG noted that the service from the Aboriginal Clinic is ok but he is 
concerned about the financial impact. He said he was supposed to be getting free 
medication under “Closing the Gap” but noted that the GP was not wanting to get involved 
as “there is too much paper work”. CG said he had to change his GP after 15 years and he 
didn’t want to but couldn’t afford not to.  
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WR’s Story 
WR is an Aboriginal man in his early 50’s. He was diagnosed 20 years ago and found out he 
had diabetes after drinking a lot of sugary drinks and woke up one morning and couldn’t 
see. WR sees a CDE regularly. He noted that until recently he believed that the range of 
professionals he sees were not talking to each other about how best to manage his 
condition and this has only occurred now because of the ATSI Primary Health Clinic 
interventions. He noted that although he had a family GP for a number of years he was not 
doing anything to effectively manage his condition; he was just increasing medication levels 
and since moving to the Aboriginal clinic they pay much more attention to his care. 
WR felt the focus is now more on measures to deal with achieving “wellness” but in some 
instances GP’s use fear eg don’t drink alcohol with these drugs otherwise there will be 
serious outcomes. WR said he would love to be involved in a pilot program to know about 
the future of his condition. He expressed concern that there is not a lot of empathy for 
people with diabetes – you feel alone – and people (not professionals) have the attitude you 
should “build a bridge and get over it”. 
LB’s Story 
LB is a female in her 30’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes 3 years ago. She said 
GP provides good treatment – they regularly check diet, feet, HbA1c levels and refers her to 
an endocrinologist. She said she has had a rough 2 years with fluctuating sugar levels, 
however only she has seen a specialist only once at a public hospital, noting it is hard to get 
an appointment and even though she has private health insurance, living on the fringe of the 
city it is impossible to see a private specialist, as her suburb is regarded as being in the 
country. 
LB indicated there is no communication between professionals she is seeing and only the 
only contact is the referral letter. She said there is a disconnect between the public and 
private sectors. She suggested that public endocrinologists are under huge pressure and 
don’t have time. She noted that on the last 2 appointments she saw students and not the 
specialist. LB also said GPs struggle with providing comprehensive care, she said her GP 
did not know about operation of her new insulin pump.  
LB has to purchase boxes of insulin for her pump and pump parts need replacing every 3 
months - cost $50 to $80 per month all up at least – “if you can’t afford it you can’t afford it”. 
She said without assistance people take short cuts which in turn affects treatment. Also 
once people turn 18 assistance cuts out as though people no longer require treatment 
beyond 18. LB said she could make an informed decision to join a pilot program as she 
knows more than her GP about her condition. 
MC’s Story 
MC is a female in her late 30’s. She was diagnosed 20 years ago after she had a virus, 
which developed into measles and then pneumonia. She lost of lot of weight and her 
diagnosis was confirmed. She did not believe the “professionals” she sees talk to each other 
and plan things together about her diabetes. This was confirmed when she was pregnant 
noting no obvious consultation between professionals. Through her pregnancy MC stated 
she did not receive good advice; she knew more about her condition and diabetes generally 
than the professionals in hospital. She said they “had no idea!” 
MC said the only conversation she had with her GP was about the length of time it takes to 
get an appointment with the specialist. She indicated that she does not have a conversation 
on the bigger picture with her GP as they are focussed only on the issue at hand. She 
thought one reason for this is they probably don’t have the time. Another reason is they 
probably don’t know what questions to ask or advice to give! But MC also noted that she has 
more understanding of her condition as she has studied and researched it for 20 years. 
P a g e  | 16 
MC said there is a need for a lot more focus on exercise – even though it can be “scary” but 
regard it as very important to keep and stay healthy. She said a lot of it is guessing and 
making it up as you go along. MC made the comment that providing extra funding to GPs 
may not be the answer – it may be preferable to have Diabetes centres of excellence. 
Summary 
The focus groups informed the structure of the applied economic model (computer model) 
by identifying the sources of variability of patients’ care needs and in their types of GPs. 
Issues included: 
> Some patients benefit from GPs having referral networks whereas other patients 
develop their own networks. 
> Some patients have specific needs regarding the broader qualities of AHS providers, 
for example education for patients with a number of comorbidities or language 
barriers. 
> Patients perceived GPs as variable in quality of the care they provide. 
> Patients preferred longer consultations with their GPs to shorter consultations, when 
revising their care needs. 
POLICY NARRATIVE 
The policy narrative is the story that surround, supports and justifies the proposed policy. In 
many cases it reveals the omissions from the policy development process (the implicit 
assumptions).  
The use of the policy narrative to critique economic development models was first proposed 
by Roe8. Roe argued that the policy narrative simplifies the relationship between cause and 
effect and, if it is sufficiently persuasive if can lead to evidence being ignored or critical 
parameters that determine outcomes being ignored. The review of the policy narrative for 
this research was targeted to the literature and media releases by DoHA, however, some 
references are made to published critiques of these polices. The main objective was to 
understand the simplified cause and effect inherent in this narrative and the implications for 
omitted parameters. 
The Australian policy narrative around diabetes and primary care from 1999 to 2011 was 
reviewed for this project. The key themes, and any changes in these themes, were noted, as 
were omissions relating to the issues around heterogeneity of patients and GPs.  
The main ongoing theme was the limitation of the MBS fee for service as way of financing 
CDM and that this was the primary causal factor for poor patient outcomes. While there are 
a number of references to gaps between optimal and current care (the extent of poor 
outcomes), there is no evidence provided about the quantification of this gap, for example, 
does this relate to 10%, 20% or 60% of all patients.  
In the following three sections, the analysis of the policy narrative is presented in three 
parts: 
> Identifying the main triggers for the choice of a scheme external to the MBS by 
reviewing the attempts to improve chronic disease management (CDM) by changing 
the MBS items. 
> Reviewing how other schemes that are used to finance primary care outside the 
MBS address risks associated with these schemes. 
> Combining the previous sections on the focus groups and structural parameters (e.g. 
patient heterogeneity) with the discussion on the policy narrative to identify 
omissions in the policy narrative.  
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The rationale of this approach is that the omissions in the policy narrative represent possible 
risks in the policy; if parameters are not identified, they cannot be managed.   
Changes to the MBS to accommodate CDM 
In 1999, the Commonwealth introduced items onto the MBS to encourage: i) care planning 
by GPs; and ii) GPs to work with multidisciplinary teams (MDTs) to provide care for people 
with chronic disease. This initiative, the Enhanced Primary Care Package10, was a response 
to the concern that the MBS did not generate the incentives necessary for CDM.11 One 
commentary on the early initiatives to encourage more GPs to provide intense management 
to diabetes patients raised the question of what would GPs need to give up in terms of 
patient care; coughs and colds or more serious chronic conditions for which there was no 
additional incentive. (See Appendix 2 “MBS Diabetes Initiatives”) 
In the following years, further initiatives were introduced. By 2011, a number of MBS Items 
that had been introduced to the MBS in 1999 and the early 2000s had been replaced or 
removed. The imperative to continue changing these items probably contributed to the 
complexity of the process of claiming the relevant items; “the red tape”.12 
There was a ten year period over which changes were made to the MBS to increase its 
capacity to accommodate CDM. However, at the end of 2010 decision makers  appear to 
have come to the same conclusions as they had when the 1997 Coordinated Care Trials 
commenced: the only solution is to have a financing system that is outside the MBS. Hence, 
the DCC Initiative was designed to be financed using a scheme external to the MBS. 
However, the MBS changed in some fundamental ways as a consequence of this decade of 
reforms. First, GPs could be paid for being involved in the care planning process, with the 
expectation that some of these activities could be performed by practice nurses. Second, 
GPs would be paid to perform services without the patient being present. These services 
were specifically related to case conferences with other team members. And third, GPs 
could refer patients to AHS providers who would be able to provide up to five consultations 
for which reimbursement could be claimed by the patient from the MBS. (These AHS 
providers had their services subsidised by the MBS for the first time.) Other changes include 
additional Practice Incentive Payments (PIP) and financing of Divisions of General Practice 
to train and educate GPs and practices on the initiatives.  
In summary, the view that the MBS fee for service cannot adequately support best practice 
care for patients with chronic disease has not changed since 1999. If the policy reforms 
since 1999 have not had the anticipated benefits, then it is possible that the major finding 
from 10 years of reform is that a universal health care scheme cannot provide incentives for 
CDM, even if specific changes are made. If the MBS cannot be adapted to accommodate 
CDM, then alternative financing structures for primary care are necessary.  
Other schemes that work outside the MBS 
THC solutions is a term used to describe a health care financing solution that finances 
primary care provided to specific patient groups, but uses funding and fee schedules other 
than the MBS. Examples of such solutions include care provided to veterans (DVA), injured 
workers (e.g. WorkCover) and persons injured in vehicle accidents, (motor accident 
schemes). Private health insurance also covers some aspects of primary care in certain 
circumstances. The key message from reviewing other schemes is that they all have a 
higher degree of structure around GP - scheme relationship, compared to the MBS. For 
example, they might require GPs provide report directly to the scheme about patients. Or 
they might require GP to undergo special training to be able to provide services within that 
scheme. 
THC solutions were first explored as a response to the complexities of managing chronic 
conditions within the MBS fee structure in the 1997 to 2000 Australian Coordinated Care 
Trials. These trials were premised on significant reductions in MBS, PBS and hospital 
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admissions achieved by increased up front spending on improved coordination, care plans 
and improved access to AHS. However, the reality was that these gains did not eventuate.13 
THC solutions for patients whose services are currently reimbursed through the MBS could 
take any one of a number of forms but have two key characteristics in common:  
> The success of any THC is defined in terms of patient outcomes relative to the 
outcomes for these patients under their options in existing care, including options 
outside mainstream primary care; and  
> Critical to this success is a different set of incentives, particularly financial incentives, 
for providers, particularly GPs, compared to what they would otherwise have.  
The DCCI and the Diabetes Pilot are examples of THCs. In addition to the elements above, 
there is an opportunity to finance positions such as a care coordinator that can be used by a 
practice but not financed by that practice. This element not only provides smaller clinics with 
the efficiencies possible from the economies of scale available to larger clinics, but it also 
provides a directed infrastructure subsidy. This contrasts to the undirected subsidies of the 
Practice Incentive Payments (PIP) initiatives.  
In summary, there are a number of primary care financing schemes outside the MBS, most 
of which operate under different legislation to the MBS, often State based. One difference 
between these schemes and the MBS is the relationship between the GP and the financer.  
Omissions in the policy narrative 
One set of omissions from the policy narrative is a discussion of the implications for the 
policy design of the lower than anticipated uptake of the CDM MBS initiatives. For example, 
will taking the financing structure outside the MBS resolve the structural issues that could 
have prevented uptake of the MBS items. For example: i) exactly what types of guidelines 
are useful to aide clinical decision making; ii) is it useful to treat complex patients as series 
of chronic diseases; and iii) how significantly do care models need to change within a 
general practice to accommodate changes in the MBS?14,15  
A major omission is the parameters that HTA identifies as essential in health technology 
policy decisions: heterogeneity in capacity for patients to benefit from the policy and 
evidence that there will be a benefit to patients provided with the new technology. 
Specifically, there is no discussion of: 
> heterogeneity in the patient CtB from enrolment into this model,  
> GP heterogeneity in quality of care currently and response to interventions.  
Furthermore, there is no estimate of the proportion of patients who receive suboptimal care 
currently. There is some discussion about the variability in access to AHSs.  
SCENARIOS TO AVOID 
The review of the policy narrative, in terms of the inclusions and omissions, and the results 
of the focus group were used to identify three scenarios that could arise because the “known 
unknowns” were not appropriately accommodated in the policy design. These are sources of 
risk and opportunities for risk management. 
The questions that were asked to identify the risks are: 
> What if patients whose care and outcomes are currently optimal would prefer not to 
be part of a pilot of a THC scheme?   
> If all GPs have a CtB financially from the patients they choose to enrol, is this a 
sufficient reason to enrol a patient with no CtB from changed care?  
> Will researchers, initially, and GPs, subsequently, have an incentive to convey the 
message that all patients have the potential to benefit from the initiative?   
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These three scenarios are summarized below and detailed in Appendix 4 “Scenarios to 
avoid (detailed)”. 
1. Patients: 
a. whose current outcomes are good  
b. have no CtB from enrolling into an alternative scheme  
c. but whose GPs have a financial incentive to enrol them, 
2. Patients: 
a. whose current outcomes are poor  
b. for whom improved outcomes are likely to be conditional on the GP changing 
clinical practice, from currently suboptimal to optimal 
c. for whom there is a high probability that the GP will not change their practice. 
3. Patients: 
a. whose current outcomes are poor and  
b. who are likely to benefit from options other than either current care or THC, for 
example a multidisciplinary team at a Tertiary Diabetes Centre (TDC), a nurse 
led clinic, an IHS or a migrant health centre. 
SUMMARY 
The key “known unknowns” identified in this step are: 
> heterogeneity across patients in CtB from the policy,  
> heterogeneity in GPs in capacity to respond to the policy by improving the quality of 
their care, and 
> heterogeneity in the service models patients have access to.  
The interactions between these parameters are also structural parameters of uncertain 
values. The next step is to specify these in a spreadsheet simulation as an applied 
economic model and explore these parameters and the relationship between them.  
Specification of structural parameters 
The computer simulation (an applied economic model) was specified using the information 
presented in the previous chapter. A generic structure for a primary health care model was 
identified. Some of the technical details are provided in Appendix 10 “Policy simulation in 
primary care – some issues for modellers” and the spreadsheet model is available on 
request. Then the specifics of the policy were modeled. 
MODEL STRUCTURE:  PLAYERS AND SETTINGS 
There are two steps in developing a typology for a policy simulation. First, the elements of 
the computer model are identified; in this case GPs, patients and the service model within 
which the GP and patient interact. Second, classifications are developed for each element 
allowing the heterogeneity to be specified in the model. In this case: two types of GPs; 
seven types of patients; and four GP-centric service models. Additionally, there is a range of 
non-GP-centric service models. Summaries of each of these types are presented below.  
General Practitioners 
Two possible typologies were identified for GPs: i) Just Dr. Average (only one type) and ii) 
Mixed (two types). The distinguishing feature of these typologies is length of consultation. 
Essentially, the first typology assumes that a distribution of GPs by mean length of their 
consultations is unimodal and has a small standard deviation. The second typology 
assumes that this distribution is bi-modal: GPs can be classified as either short or long style. 
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Appendix 11 “Do All Australian GPs practice 14 minute medicine (on average)” sets out the 
rationale for these two typologies. Also, Appendix 8 sets out an example from the literature 
that raises the potential for, but does not explicitly consider, GP heterogeneity.  
In the spreadsheet model, by specifying 100% of GPs as belonging to either all Dr. 
Comprehensive or all Dr. Six Minute, then the assumption of Dr. Average as being typical of 
all GPs could be specified.  
Typology 1: Just Dr. Average 
This is the typology implicit in the policy narrative. If each GP in Australia were represented 
as a distribution of the length of their consultations, they would all have the same proportion 
of long and short consultations and hence the same average duration of consultations. 
Variations in income would be due to the proportion of consultations that are bulk billed or 
the hours worked each week, rather than the mix of consultations. All GPs would respond 
similarly to the changed incentives of THC, for example they could all change the proportion 
of longer consultations from 10% to 20%. 
Typology 2: Mixed 
The two types of GPs are: Dr. Comprehensive and Dr. Six Minute.  
> Dr. Comprehensive types plan their days with 15 minute consultations and 2 to 3 
minutes between each patient. They regularly have half hour consultations during the 
week. The average practice revenue from consultations by this type of doctor is 
around $140 an hour: $35 from each of two 15 minute Level Bs and $69 from a 30 
minute Level C. They bulk bill their patients, who are mainly older.  
> Dr. Six Minute types plan for 8 level B consultations an hour, which bring in $280 in 
MBS revenue an hour.16 This type of GP will rarely do more than one problem in 
each consultation and will ask the patient to come back the following week if the 
consultation is about to go over 6 minutes.  
Dr. Comprehensive types may or may not provide better quality of care to their patients 
compared to Dr. Six Minute. If Dr. Six Minute is in an area with a low ratio of GPs to patients, 
then their strategy could be the best option for both practice income and population health. 
Dr. Comprehensive might refer to other providers such as diabetes educators, or could take 
on the task of diabetes education. Dr. Comprehensive is likely to provide better quality of 
care to complex patients for whom longer consultations are necessary. However Dr. 
Comprehensive’s consultations could be longer simply because they converse socially with 
patients.   
This typology illustrates how if GPs have different practice styles, the MBS schedule 
generates variability across GPs in the MBS revenue per GP per hour. It also shows how a 
GP will make a financial loss compared to their maximum possible income if he or she 
adopts the style of Dr. Comprehensive rather than Dr. Six Minute. It illustrates that, to the 
extent that complex patient CDM necessitates longer consultations, then Dr. Six Minute is 
less likely compared to Dr. Comprehensive to change practice to provide more of such care. 
In other words, the financial loss of changed practice could dominate his or her choices. 
However, if improved CDM is driven by increased referrals and increased delegation to 
practice nurses then, then this could be accommodated by both types of GPs.  
Patients 
The computer model has seven types of patients differentiated by four different 
characteristics: 
> complexity (complex and less complex);  
> and sensitivity or otherwise to each of 
o quality of GP care,  
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o quantity of AHS; and  
o both quality and quantity of AHS.  
The way in which these four characteristics combine to form seven patient types is 
illustrated in the top half of Table 1. Patients can have three current health outcomes: good, 
moderate or poor. Each type’s health outcome is a function of that type’s own characteristics 
and care context (GP type plus service setting). In this model, the patients are not 
characterised by the factors that influence their current outcomes, for example the presence 
of comorbidities such as depression and heart failure or socio-economic determinants. 
Instead, they are characterised by their CtB from (respond to) a range of care or treatment 
situations, or, in other words, the context being impacted by the initiative. This approach 
(classify patients by their CtB) is analogous to the way that capitation systems with multiple 
payments classify patients by what determines heterogeneity in total costs of care, for 
example, initial year of diagnosis or subsequent year.  
Table 1 Seven patient types defined by four characteristics and linked to outcomes 
Patient types by complexity and sensitivity 
to service model and GP care quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  Complex        
Sensitivity 
to care 
and 
service 
model 
Sensitive to GP care        
Sensitive to quantity        
Sensitive to quantity & quality        
Patient outcomes by patient type and 
context (GP care and service model) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
GP care 
optimal 
Quality and quantity G M M M M P G 
Quantity M M M P M P G 
Limited M P M P P P G 
GP care  
suboptimal 
Quality and quantity M M P P M P G 
Quantity P M P M M P G 
limited P P P P P P G 
Legend: G = Good outcomes; M = Moderate Outcomes; P = Poor outcomes 
An example of a patient who is complex and is sensitive to GP quality is one who requires 
longer consultations and if he or she has these, the source of their complexity can be 
addressed and outcomes improved. An example of a patient who is sensitive to quality as 
well as quantity of AHS is a recently arrived refugee who is not fluent in English and needs 
an interpreter to assist them with the complexities of diabetes education. Some patients are 
complex and have high level of service use but their outcomes remain poor, regardless of 
the quality and quantity of their care. Less complex patients might have good outcomes, 
with short consultations only and education provided by a practice nurse. 
Service models 
There are four types of GP-centric service models: Solo GPs; GP plus practice nurse; GP 
plus primary care referrals (not team based); and multi-disciplinary team in primary care 
setting. The outcomes of each of these service model in terms of the quality and quantity of 
access to AHSs, for example diabetes education, is assumed to vary across these models. 
For example, some but not all GPs who work in solo practices will have the skills and 
experience to provide up-to-date diabetes education. Some, not all, solo GPs will refer to 
AHS providers if they do not have the time or experience for diabetes education. Patients 
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who see GPs who work in multidisciplinary teams are more likely to have access to quantity 
and quality of AHS.  
There are also non GP-centric service models available to patients; different GP-centric 
primary care is not the only option available to patients. Indigenous Health Services (IHSs) 
provide services in a culturally appropriate setting and with culturally aware staff. An 
important example in Brisbane is the Inala Health Service, which has recently demonstrated 
improvements in care and outcomes for Indigenous Australians with chronic disease 
including diabetes.17 Tertiary Diabetes Centres (TDCs) provide care to patients in an 
outpatient setting. Patients have access to multidisciplinary teams that include: 
endocrinologists, diabetes educators, podiatrists, dieticians, psychologists and exercise 
physiologists. Such centres will often provide care to more complex patients, including 
people with type 1 diabetes and gestational diabetes. TDCs also see patients who are 
referred by GPs for a range of reasons, including starting on insulin.18  
And finally, Diabetes Educator led clinics, operating outside a general practice are not yet a 
permanently funded part of the Australian health care system. There are opportunities to 
expand these models of service delivery, however, the lack of additional funding outside the 
community health sector will constrain this growth. For example, a nurse led clinic in 
Canberra is funded entirely outside the MBS.19 
INTERVENTION:  HOW  W ILL IT  THIS W ORK? 
For the purpose of the policy simulation, the intervention was characterised as having three 
components, which are generalisable to any CDM intervention within THC:  
1. Increased financial payment for GPs to provide the set of care planning services plus the 
possibility of "pay for performance" or for compliance with guidelines for referrals.  
2. Three elements of the strategy to improve information systems:  
a. Transfer of electronic information between providers in different organizations. 
b. Improved patient records and improved data extraction to review these records, 
including software that prompts the more straight forward aspects of the care 
guidelines. For example: Was a foot check performed? What was the result? 
c. Clinical decision support software that supports a GP through complex clinical 
decision making. For example, if a patient has a number of co-morbidities, how 
does this influence initiation and ongoing prescribing of insulin and the decision 
to treat within a General Practice rather than within a Multi-Disciplinary Team.  
3. Improved access to AHSs via either improved referral networks or MDTs. 
The policy simulation did not explicitly consider the effect of financial incentives for pay for 
performance because insufficient detail on these was available. Instead it assumed that GPs 
will enrol a patient only if there is no financial loss relative to the MBS revenue received if 
they did not enrol that patient. This net effect on financial revenue is determined by both the 
opportunity cost of spending more time with this patient and less time on other work and the 
increase in the revenue paid for care for that patient.  
However, the simulation was structured to allow for the possibility that heterogeneity in GP 
characteristics could result in differential uptake of one or more of the components of the 
intervention, or differential incentive to enrol a given patient. Specifically, the model 
accommodates the following scenarios.  
> Dr. Comprehensive is providing a bundle of services for a given patient and currently 
receives $450 in revenue for 5 hours of care over one year; an average hourly rate of 
$90, which is consistent with his or her average hourly rate. If the payment for the 
bundle of services that was expected to be provided to that patient under changed 
care were $600, and the hours were increased from 5 to 6 per year; this would 
represent an hourly rate of $100.This would equate to a premium compared to his or 
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her existing average hourly rate for care generally of $90. Hence there would be a 
financial incentive for Dr. Comprehensive to enrol his or her patient. 
> In contrast, Dr. Six Minute could be providing care for an average hourly fee of $120 
across his or her patients. This GP could also be providing care for 5 hours a year for 
this patient, but be receiving $600 a year. Differences could include a patient 
copayment for each item 23 and only one problem is addressed in each consultation, 
which is shorter on average compared to Dr. Comprehensive. There is no financial 
incentive for Dr. Six Minute to enrol his or her patient in the new scheme, regardless 
of the patient’s CtB and regardless to the financial advantage to Dr. Comprehensive.  
SCENARIOS:  HOW  THE TYPES INTERACT W ITH 
EACH OTHER AND THE INTERVENTION TO 
PRODUCE OUTCOMES 
The typology, the intervention, and the outcomes for patients are brought together in an 
input table on the simulation spreadsheet that identifies, in this case, 37 scenarios about 
how these elements interact. Table 1 summarises how a patient of a given type (1 to 7) 
interacts with a given context (GP care quality and service model outcome (access to quality 
and quantity) to produce a health outcome (good (G), moderate (M), poor (P)). The tool 
allows the user to select the health outcomes for a given combination.  
In the version presented in this report, the user has specified that if the patient is not 
complex, then, regardless of the health service model and GP quality, the health outcomes 
will be "good". Patient 7 is complex, and sensitive to service model quality and quantity and 
clinical quality. As this patient’s access to service models that have both quality and quantity 
improves, and GP quality improves, so does his or her outcomes. In the computer model, 
the function of this table is to specify the  pre and post health states for seven types of 
patients in six possible contexts; a total of 37 possible scenarios.  
The intervention acts to move some, but not all, patients to better health service models and 
better GP care. This specification allows a given patient's CtB from the changed policy to be 
predicted based on heterogeneity in the patient, the GPs care and service model. What is a 
good, moderate or poor outcome? In this case it is HbA1c control. This model can be 
adapted for other conditions by changing the indicators under good, moderate or poor 
outcomes. 
SUMMARY 
The five “known unknowns” identified in the review of the generic HTA model and the policy 
narrative and the types identified in the focus groups informed a formal specification of the 
applied economic model as a spreadsheet model. The full set of input models is presented 
in Appendix 7 “Model input tables”. 
Typically, the next step would be to address the following question: What quantitative values 
should the parameters take? This model is unusual because all the parameters in the model 
are “known unknowns”; there are no values in the public domain. If this model were based 
only on EBM, the process would stop here; we cannot assume values for these parameters 
(e.g. heterogeneity of GPs) because there is no evidence. The advantage of policy 
simulation compared to EBM as a way of informing policy is that it requires decision makers  
to identify the default or implicit assumptions in policies. Policy simulation recognises that 
even though estimates are not available, assumptions still need to be made in order to 
assess a policy prospectively. Then alternative assumptions that are at least equally 
plausible are identified. The sensitivity of outcomes to equally or more plausible 
assumptions can then be tested. 
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Analysis of “known unknowns” 
The process of selecting inputs for the policy simulation is described in Appendix 7 “Model 
input tables”. However, the advantage of this approach is difficult to demonstrate with the 
input tables alone. Furthermore, the output tables are difficult to present without the 
interactive process, mainly because there are multiple parameters and any output table 
requires a range of parameters and their relationship to be identified. We used an alternative 
to displaying output tables that can be thought of as translating a multi-dimensional model 
into a series of simple 2D models. These can then be used to illustrate the difference 
between the default and possible alternative values of a range of structural parameters and 
relationships between parameters.  
In the following series of charts, each of the “known unknowns” are analysed using the 
following questions: 
> What is the implicit assumption in the policy narrative? 
> What is a plausible alternative to this assumption? 
> How is this specified in the computer simulation? 
> Does it matter what value this parameter has? 
We start with GP heterogeneity and then introduce heterogeneity of patient CtB. The 
specific structural parameters reviewed in this section relate to the idea of the existence of 
different types of GPs, where type may or may not be a determinant of patient outcomes 
under current care or THC. The questions that will be considered include: 
1. Is there a uni- or multi-modal distribution of GPs by average duration of consultation?  
2. Is type of GP associated with:  
a. patient outcome under current care? 
b. patient CtB from intervention? 
c. any potential selection bias in enrolment? 
The first five diagrams explore the question of GP type and relationship to current outcomes.  
 
Evidence we have: 
We start with a cohort of 10,000 diabetes patients 
who have either good outcomes under the current 
system or poor outcomes, however poor and good 
are defined. In this example, 20% have poor 
outcomes. The policy narrative attributes this gap to a 
range of factors including the MBS financing 
structure. However, it does not quantify this gap. 
 
Scenario 1  
The implicit assumption in the policy narrative is 
that, because we have no evidence to assume 
otherwise, we should assume that there is no 
characteristic of a GP that would result in variability 
in patient outcomes – all GPs are Dr. Average. (In 
the terms of this policy simulation.)  Hence, all GPs 
have 20% of patients with poor outcomes. 
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Scenario 2  
An alternative assumption is that there are two 
types of GPs, some of whom practice primarily 
longer and other shorter consultations. In this 
example we assume that that 50% of GPs are in 
each group. We also assume that the type of GP 
does not influence patient outcome, hence 20% of 
patients in each type of GP have poor outcomes. 
 
Scenario 3  
A third scenario is that GPs are heterogeneous and 
the type of GP does influence outcomes of patients 
with chronic disease. In this case we assume that 
90% of all Dr. Comprehensive patients have good 
outcomes whereas 60% of all Dr. Six Minutes 
patients have good outcomes. In this simple version 
it is assumed that GP practice style is the only 
determinant of this variation across GP type.  
 
Scenario 4  
A fourth possible scenario is that all patients seen by 
Dr. Six Minute GPs have poor outcomes whereas all 
patients seen by Dr. Comprehensive have good 
outcomes. In this case we need to assume that only 
20% of all GPs are of the Dr. Six Minute type. This 
demonstrates the interrelatedness of the parameters 
(% of GPs of each type, % of all patients with poor 
outcomes). 
The previous diagrams consider a range of scenarios about the mix of GPs and the 
relationship of GP type to patient outcomes. The default assumption, in the absence of 
evidence, is Scenario 1 – all GPs are of the same type and the patients with poor outcomes 
are distributed uniformly across GPs. The remaining Scenarios explore the possibility that a 
distribution of GPs by mean consultation duration is bi-modal – there are two broad types. 
Scenario 2 assumes that there are types but types do not influence patient outcomes (pre-
intervention). Scenario 3 assumes that GP type can be one factor that influences current 
patient outcomes. (The rationale is set out in Appendix 11.) Scenario 4 assumes that GP 
type is the only factor that influences outcomes. Scenario 4 is considered implausible but 
Scenarios 2 and 3 are considered plausible. 
The critical difference in policy simulation and EMB is this: An EBM policy researcher 
could argue that there is no evidence as to the proportion of GPs in each type or that type 
influences current outcome, therefore we should assume scenario 1. Using policy 
simulation, we conclude that in the absence of evidence, Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 are all 
plausible. 
Does it matter whether GPs are of variable type and whether type influences current 
outcome?  
To address this question we first, assume that: i) all enrolled patients will achieve good 
outcomes post intervention; ii) all GPs have the same incentive to enrol patients; and iii) 
type, if it exists, does not influence patients outcomes post intervention. In terms of 
achieving improvement in patient outcomes, GP type is irrelevant in this situation. (It could 
matter however if there are additional costs associated with this policy and the same 
outcomes could have been achieved by targeting it only to patients who have poor 
outcomes.) 
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Now assume that: 
> type does influence patient’s current outcomes (Scenario 2 or 3 above apply),  
> GP incentive to enrol is influenced by type (due to the different opportunity cost of 
longer consultations by GP type); and  
> patients with poor outcomes can have a CtB from DCC that is a function of GP type. 
These assumptions are not evidence-based, however, nor are the default (implicit) 
assumptions (above). The reason why these plausible alternatives to the implicit 
assumptions matter is because they introduce a range of risks including those identified 
previous as scenarios to avoid. For example, a scenario that decision makers  could wish to 
avoid is a GP who enrols a patient with poor outcomes, where GP practice style contributes 
to this poor outcome and this type of GP is unlikely to respond to the intervention by 
changing practice. This situation could be the result of a financial incentive to enrol the 
patient, but a financial disincentive to change practice style. (See Appendix 4 for a detailed 
discussion of the scenarios to avoid.) 
The following three diagrams demonstrate some of the associated risks of not recognising 
GP types and other “known unknowns”.  
 
Scenario 5: 
The diagram on the left is a hypothetical outcome for 
enrolled patients post intervention – 90% have good 
outcomes compared to 80% prior to a DCC Initiative. 
This result could be consistent with all GPs achieving 
the same share of patients with good outcomes – an 
extension of Scenarios 1, 2 and 3 above. It could also 
be consistent with a situation where GPs can be 
classified by type and type determines response to 
DCC.  
 
Scenario 6: 
 This scenario is a post intervention extension of 
Scenario 2 above. In this case GPs have the same 
result pre and post (for enrolled patients). However, 
there could be an additional influence which is that 
GPs have a preference for enrolling patients whose 
final results are most likely to be “good” post 
enrolment. In this case the results for enrolled patients 
are not generalisable to unenrolled. Alternatively the 
bias might only be relevant to Dr. Six Minute who 
could have a financial disincentive to enrol patients 
who require the GP to change their practice style and 
which will result in a reduced income. 
The objective of the policy simulation is to formally consider the possibility that, in the 
absence of evidence, the default or implicit assumption is not the only plausible assumption. 
The structural parameters were reviewed in the simulation and the following risks and 
associated strategies were identified in cases where it matters what assumption we make in 
the absence of evidence.  
Risk management strategies 
All risk management strategies in this report are based on the following assumption: 
> GPs will only enrol a cohort of patients if the expected income is no less than the 
opportunity cost (foregone income) of providing care. 
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That is, we assume that GPs will act as “rational economic agents”; they will not make a 
systematic change to their practice that reduces their expected income. In other words, GPs 
are assumed to enrol patients only if there is a capacity for GPs to benefit financially, or to 
make no financial loss. 
This explicit assumption could be challenged by another research team. 
ENHANCED CONSENT PROCESS 
The key risk is that patients with no CtB from THC will be enrolled without a full 
understanding of their CtB from enrolment. This can occur if: 
> GPs are optimistic (overstate) the potential for a patient to have a CtB from 
enrolment and will tell a patient they have a CtB, even if this is not the case. 
> GPs currently provide less than optimal care, have a financial incentive to enrol 
patients but no financial incentive to change their practice, hence the patients have 
no CtB. 
> Patients and GPs do not have a shared understanding of the reasons why a given 
patient’s outcomes are poor under current care. In short, if the reason a patient’s 
current outcomes are poor is due to the quality of the GP’s care, will the GP 
recognise this, will he or she tell the patient or will the GP attribute poor outcomes to 
other factors.  
This issue of over optimistic estimate of the CtB from changed care is distinct from the 
issues arising from the need for patients to have a culturally and linguistically appropriate 
enrolment process. This situation could occur whether or not the patient has a complete 
understanding of what is communicated. The issue of interest is the explication of patient 
CtB from enrolment.  
The risk management strategy is enhanced enrolment. First, patients enrolling in DCCI 
should be informed by an objective assessment of their CtB from enrolment. It is assumed 
that patients will be assessed at enrolment in order to classify them for capitation purposes 
(complex, recently diagnosed etc.). This assessment does not inform the patient of their CtB 
from enrolment, only the expected costs of their care and expected services.  
Second, to inform a patient of their CtB, additional assessments are necessary. A pre 
enrolment process should identify factors that influence current health status such as GP 
care quality, Practice IT and decision support software and access to AHS. It should also 
assess whether the factors influencing the patient’s current outcomes are likely to change 
under DCCI, including the care currently provided by the GP. Hence, the patient consent 
process should be preceded by a peer review of the quality of care provided to each patient.  
THIRD OPTION FOR CARE  
The risk is that: 
> a patient with poor outcomes under current care is enrolled in THC but their best 
option is to be referred to another organization that specialises in diabetes care for 
patients whose care is complex. 
The risk management strategy is that, as part of the enrolment strategy is to ensure that 
GPs and patients are presented with an alternative to both current care and enrolling in a 
THC. Such care options include: Indigenous Health services; Migrant Health services; 
specialist diabetes clinics - TDCs. In some cases this could involve patents being referred to 
specific MDTs rather than referral within a network of providers.  
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REPORTING ON BOTH ENROLLED AND 
UNENROLLED PATIENTS 
The risks are that: 
> GPs and or practices will be strategic in enrolling patients. They will not enrol 
patients who are less likely to meet the requirements for pay for performance, to 
attend all necessary consultations and more likely to have significant comorbidities 
such as depression, heart disease and respiratory illness. 
> Evaluation of the DCC pilot and initiative will exclude unenrolled patients at 
participating practices and practices that do not participate and hence there is a risk 
of a systematic bias in the measurement of the benefit of DCC and a potential to 
overestimate the performance of the participating GPs. 
The risk management strategy is that MBS (and extra MBS) services and, where possible, 
outcomes such as hospital admissions, should be reported to monitor the ongoing effects of 
the initiative. This reporting should include: 
> diabetes patients who do and do not enrol from a given practice; and  
> from participating and non-participating practices . 
Characteristics of participating GPs can be compared with non-participating GPs using 
Medicare Australia data, without identifying individual GPs or patients. For example, whether 
GPs are doing predominately long or shorter consultations, their prescribing of diabetes 
medications and their historic use of care planning items. 
MODELS OF AHS DELIVERY 
The risks are: 
> A model designed to increase access to AHSs and MDTs will increase use of these 
services and that this increase comes at a cost of services available for those who 
are not enrolled. There  are two  equity issues: 
o  access to these AHSs for patients whose GPs are not participating vs. patients 
whose GPs are participating 
o Access to AHSs for two ppatints whose GP is pariapting, but only one of is 
enrolled. 
> There are equity and effectiveness issues if more complex patients are not enrolled 
and have less access to AHS compared to patients with less complex needs and 
who are more likely to be enrolled. 
Increased demand for AHSs, a constrained resource, is an inevitable result of a policy 
responding to poor access to such services. Improved referral process can improve access 
but improved service models are necessary to improve the efficiency with which constrained 
resources are able to supply increased demand.  
Risk management strategies include improved reporting of service use (see previous 
recommendation) and methods to improve the efficiency with which AHSs can be provided. 
Results 
Results against the original research questions are reported in Appendix 1. The results 
reported against the final research questions are reviewed below. 
1. How can a policy simulation be used to inform any THC style initiative? 
The first challenge was technical. Policy simulations designed for primary care need to be 
able to specify interactions between:  
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> Intervention;  
> Patient; 
> Health care setting; and  
> Key provider (the GP in this case). 
 In contrast, HTA simulations, while they have other complexities, essentially assume no 
strategic behaviour and focus on the interaction between the patient and the intervention. 
From a technical perspective, this task is challenging. The approach used in this project was 
to develop a hypothetical individual patient simulation, with the addition of a cohort of GPs 
that could interact with the individual patient cohort. A scenario table provided possible 
outcomes for all possible combinations of items ii) to iv) in the above list. The intervention 
determined the probability that a given individual was in a given scenario, and was 
analogous to the states in a Markov model or a micro-simulation model. The difference 
between conventional states in models and the states used in this model was that they were 
defined by patient characteristics, GP characteristics and setting rather than stage of 
disease or patient risk factors, for example.   
The second challenge was epistemological. Researchers from an EBM paradigm found 
policy simulation a difficult technique and tended, initially, to be very skeptical of its value. A 
typical response when a structural parameter was introduced to such a researcher is: “But 
there is no evidence of its value so how can we assume it has a value of x%?” A number of 
devices were developed during the research in order to address this issue. For example, the 
assumption made implicitly by the researcher was elicited, the plausibility that it had a 
different value was established, and the significance and possibility of managing the risks 
associated with the uncertainty were demonstrated. A key distinction for EBM researchers 
was the distinction between: i) assuming a parameter has a value of x%; and ii) using this 
value to test whether it matters if a parameter has a value apart from that assumed implicitly. 
The third issue was how to demonstrate validation. The validation of the method was in 
its capacity to identify structural uncertainty and risk management strategies not considered 
in the current policy narrative and policy design. Other researchers could have identified 
different sources of structural uncertainty and different risk management strategies. This is 
discussed in more detail in Appendix 12. 
2. What are the critical elements of an overarching policy framework for THC 
initiatives for CDM? 
The policy simulation identified five main sources of structural uncertainty – “known 
unknowns” – that were not part of the policy narrative and hence not explicitly considered in 
policy design. These sources of uncertainty mattered, in that their values, while uncertain, 
could impact on patient outcomes. The risk management strategies associated with these 
“known unknowns” are the critical elements of overarching policy framework.  
Recommendations and conclusions 
The policy narrative around the DCC Initiative and Pilot omits reference to the following: 
> The possibility that patients with poor outcomes will not necessarily benefit from 
changed practice, even if there is an incentive for GPs to enrol these patients. 
> The possibility that patients with currently good outcomes will not have a CtB from 
enrolment.  
> The possibility that GPs are heterogeneous and this heterogeneity influences 
heterogeneity in patient outcomes and in GP response to the DCC.  
The three recommendations are: 
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1. Any THC developed to improve care for patients should include consideration of the 
critical elements (risks and risk management strategies) identified in this research. The 
application of policy simulation in conjunction with decision makers  could identify 
additional sources of structural uncertainty and hence risk management strategies. 
2. Data that is in the private domain of Medical Practitioners and DoHA (Medicare) is used 
more effectively to inform the possible value of “known unknowns”, without 
compromising the confidentiality of individual GPs or patients. These parameters relate 
to the relationship between average length of consultation and incentive to take up the 
existing CDM items. 
3. The policy narrative should be realistic rather than optimistic about the potential benefits 
of enrolment. Not all patients with a given condition have a CtB from THC. 
This research also identified that evidence based policy does not address the “known 
unknowns” rigorously. In the absence of evidence, the assumption that there is no 
heterogeneity in patient CtB or in GP practice style is not the only option available to 
decision makers . Furthermore, failure to recognise that other assumptions are more 
plausible than “default” assumptions, can lead to a failure to recognise the risks of policy 
change and to identify strategies to minimise these risks.  
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Appendix 1 Changes to research questions 
ORIGINAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The two original objectives of this research were directly related to these potential risks 
resulting from patient heterogeneity in service needs: 
1. to identify which patients groups would be advantaged and which patient groups would 
be disadvantaged by the proposed diabetes coordinated care program; and 
2. to identify and model some options to augment the existing policy to improve the 
benefits and reduce the risks within the proposed budget. 
Given the changing policy environment and the absence of any public domain 
documentation about the proposed pilot, the objectives were revised to apply more generally 
to programs that replace elements of the universal access scheme of the MBS and have 
voluntary enrolment by patients and voluntary participation by GPs.  
Hence, the key policy issue was generalised from the specific policy initiative to: How should 
the needs of a specific group of patients be addressed within a universal health care 
scheme such as the MBS?  
The term “Tailored Health Care” (THC) is used to describe any initiative that is an alternative 
to expansion of MBS items as a strategy for addressing the needs of patients whose care 
needs are not necessarily met optimally within mainstream primary care. (This issue is 
discussed in more detail in the following section: Policy narrative and policy initiatives.) 
The original research questions were directly concerned with the proposed diabetes 
coordinated care program and the original objectives: 
1. Which patient groups will GPs have an incentive to enrol in the proposed program and 
for which groups of patients will there be no incentive to enrol in the program? 
2. Which patient groups will do better under the proposed capitation policy, and which 
patient groups will be at risk, including both enrolled and unenrolled patients? 
3. What are the broader system effects of such a policy, in particular the effect of increased 
demand for access to limited AHSs? 
4. How can the proposed policy be augmented to maximise the benefits to patients with 
complex needs while remaining within the proposed budget?   
All of these questions are based on policy simulation models that combine existing 
evidence, focus group finding and patient-provider scenarios with a range of simulation 
models to both raise and explore questions that would not necessarily be raised by pure 
empirical research. The same methods were employed for the revised research questions: 
1. How can a policy simulation be used to inform any THC style initiative, prospectively? 
2. What are the critical elements of an overarching policy framework for THC initiatives for 
Chronic Disease Management (CDM)? 
RESULTS  
1. Which patient groups will GPs have an incentive to enrol in the proposed program and 
for which groups of patients will there be no incentive to enrol in the program? 
Without information on the exact specification of the DCC pilot and intervention, the exact 
characteristics of patients for whom there is no incentive for a GP to enrol cannot be 
identified. This research identified that capacity for a patient to benefit is not a factor that 
enters the current policy narrative and hence there is no indication that GP incentive to enrol 
is related to the patient’s CtB from enrolment.  
2. Which patient groups will do better under the proposed capitation policy, and which 
patient groups will be at risk, including both enrolled and unenrolled patients? 
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Without the specifics of the DCC pilot or DCC initiative, the exact characteristics of patients 
in these two groups cannot be identified. However, this research did identify that patients 
whose GPs do respond to the changes such as decision support software will have a CtB. 
Patients at risk are those who would be better off if they accessed an option outside current 
care or DCC and unenrolled patients who have less access to AHS as a consequence of 
increased access by enrolled patients. 
3. What are the broader system effects of such a policy, in particular the effect of 
increased demand for access to limited AHSs? 
The policy narrative recognises that AHSs are currently not always accessed by patients. 
While the policy narrative does recognise the need for improved referral systems and 
communication across providers, it does not recognise the need for improved organisation 
and financing of AHS service providers. For example, if DCC provides GPs with an incentive 
to refer more appropriately (and frequently) then there will be an increased demand for 
AHSs. However, unless AHSs can work within service models that can accommodate this 
increased demand, changes in incentives for GPs to refer will not result in changes for 
patient access.  
4. How can the proposed policy be augmented to maximise the benefits to patients with 
complex needs while remaining within the proposed budget?   
By focusing on enrolling patients for whom there is a CtB from changed care, and providing 
the infrastructure required to support MDTs as well as general practice, there could be an 
improvement in the overall cost effectiveness of the scheme compared to a scheme that 
does not focus on patient CtB. This approach is similar to the idea of targeting new 
medicines and drugs that have additional cost to patients with the greatest CtB.  
How can a simulation that is built entirely on “known unknowns” be validated? There are at 
least three ways that the validity of this approach can be tested, and these are detailed in 
Appendix 12 “Validation of the policy simulation”. In summary, this policy simulation is valid 
because it identified: i) “known unknowns” and implicit assumptions; ii) plausible alternatives 
and the associated risks; and iii) testable predictions such as that the over optimistic policy 
narrative will lead to the DCC pilot being underpowered to detect any hard clinical 
endpoints. (See Appendix 6 “Effect of optimal diabetes therapy on clinical end points”.) 
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Appendix 2 MBS Diabetes initiatives, 2002 
The following editorial from 2002 was written by one of the authors of the report in 
conjunction with a GP and epidemiologist, Dr. Ben Ewald. It is included because it is a 
reminder that “some things never change”. This scheme was eventually replaced with a 
chronic disease management scheme with special MBS items for Diabetes Management 
and care planning. And these items were expected to be replaced by the Diabetes 
Coordinated Care Initiative.  
 
Australian Prescriber Editorial 2002 
Can we afford intensive management of diabetes? 
Brita Pekarsky, Senior Lecturer, Health Economics, Department of General Practice, 
University of Adelaide, Adelaide, and Ben Ewald, Lecturer, Centre for Clinical Epidemiology 
and Biostatistics, University of Newcastle, Newcastle, New South Wales 
 
Key words:  drug utilisation, general practice. 
 
(AustPrescr 2002;25:102-3) 
 
The Commonwealth budget for 2001-02 included financial incentives for general 
practitioners to provide systematic care to their patients with diabetes. This initiative is likely 
to increase the number of consultations with general practitioners, specialists and AHS 
professionals, and the number of drugs used and tests ordered. The annual cost to the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) and the Medicare Benefits Scheme of treating 
patients with diabetes will increase. This expenditure will be in addition to the funds 
allocated through the budget initiative. Furthermore, the number of patients being treated 
will continue to increase as the prevalence rises and we become better at detecting 
previously unrecognised cases. In Australia, in 2000, 770 000 people had diabetes. The 
direct annual health care costs of diabetes in 1995 were $1.4 billion1 (approximately $1800 
per patient). 
With both the number of cases and the costs of care increasing, there will be increased 
pressure in the health system and on individual general practitioners to provide more 
intensive care to more diabetic patients. What is not clear is how this change in competing 
priorities for limited resources will unfold. For example, will there be more patients on waiting 
lists for specialists and AHSs, will other patients be displaced, or will more funds be put into 
these areas? 
Some idea of the costs of treating a patient with diabetes can be gleaned from the 
Australian Co-ordinated Care Trials (1997-2000). These trials included a total of 1654 
patients with diabetes recorded as the primary diagnosis. Although these patients 
represented 15% of the intervention group there was no analysis of the effect of co-
ordinated care on their health. Using the data from 10 of these trials, the annual costs per 
patient for Medicare and PBS services varied across trials from $1900 to $3200.2 These 
costs are indicative of those associated with best practice care for older patients with 
diabetes. More intensive monitoring has significant cost implications, as it will often lead to 
more intensive treatment of blood glucose, lipids and blood pressure. 
The National Diabetes Strategy states that the UK Prospective Diabetes Study (UKPDS) 
provides evidence that intensive treatment significantly improves clinical outcomes and 
reduces diabetes-related complications. However, UKPDS showed that the benefits of 
intensive treatment of blood pressure are at least as great as the benefits of intensive 
treatment of blood glucose. Approximately six patients need to be treated intensively for 
blood pressure over 10 years to prevent one patient developing any complication, and 15 
need treatment to prevent one diabetes-related death.3 In contrast, only one case of 
microvascular disease (mostly retinopathy) was prevented for every 196 patients treated 
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with intensive glucose control for 10 years. Reductions in macrovascular complications or 
death did not reach statistical significance.4 
Increased intensive management of diabetes will increase the workload of general practice 
in differing ways across the country. In a region where there is a high ratio of general 
practitioners to patients, the additional work may be easily absorbed. However, in an area 
where there is a low ratio of general practitioners to patients, the increased demands will 
only be accommodated by displacement of other care provided by the general practitioner, 
or diversion of this workload to other staff. If a general practitioner sees fewer patients with 
coughs and colds, this may in fact be a desirable outcome, however if it is at the expense of 
other important services then any health gain in diabetes may be offset by losses in other 
areas. 
There are opportunities to reduce both the impact on the general practitioner’s workload and 
the costs to the practice of providing systematic care. These include using diabetes 
educators and practice nurses, and better information management and decision support 
software. The budget initiative has the potential to improve the flexibility of funding, allowing 
practices greater scope in deciding how diabetes care is provided. 
The additional costs of more intensive monitoring may be justified by future savings from a 
reduced need for hospitalisations to treat the complications of diabetes. The UKPDS 
included cost-effectiveness analyses for intensive blood glucose and blood pressure 
management. In both cases, more intensive management was found to be cost saving in the 
trial setting. It was expected to have additional costs, but still to be cost-effective in a 
community setting.5,6 Whether the additional costs of more intensive management for a 
number of conditions would be considered to be cost-effective is unclear. The 
pharmaceutical and diagnostic test costs of each condition managed intensively are clearly 
additive, but the health benefits may not be. Furthermore, the UK results may not be 
generalisable to Australia. 
The Australian example most frequently cited in the co-ordinated care trials was the patient 
who could not access cheap podiatry services, but then required an expensive hospital 
admission for the treatment of ‘diabetic foot’.2 The fund-holding model in the trials was 
intended to provide funding for the additional podiatry services which would be offset by the 
savings from reduced hospitalisation for complications. The evidence of either reduced 
hospital admissions or the subsequent savings was not apparent from the trials, partly 
because of their short duration and partly because improved care was more expensive. 
Despite up to 60% of all patients in some trials having diabetes, any impact on their health 
within the two-year period was not sufficient to generate the intended savings. 
The only certain and immediate consequence of more intensive management of diabetes is 
increased pressure on the resources of both general practitioners and the broader health 
care system. Any health benefits for patients may not be for some years. General 
practitioners may be consistently referring patients to podiatrists, diabetes educators and 
ophthalmologists, but are these services available in all regions to low income patients? Will 
preventive advice on lifestyle changes be provided to patients at risk? Will other patients 
with other needs find themselves less able to access care? If there are insufficient resources 
to provide intensive management to all patients with diabetes, there will be some patients 
who will miss out on some or all aspects of this care. It may be that these are the very 
patients who would benefit most from improved management, better access to AHSs and 
preventive advice. 
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 Appendix 3 Using the HTA model as a starting point to 
identify the “known unknowns” 
An HTA model emphasises the significance of heterogeneity in patient response to, or CtB 
from, a given technology or therapy. Also, patients for whom there is no benefit of the 
proposed intervention are identified. An HTA model identifies that there is no value to 
providing patients for whom there is no CtB from the intervention, even if there is a CtB for 
the owner of that technology (increased revenue). This principle, exploring patient 
heterogeneity in response to a given intervention, is central to HTA and is also relevant to a 
policy simulation such as DCC.  
One limitation of HTA models is that they are decision theoretic and therefore do not include 
strategic interactions between providers and patients. There is a possibility that a GP could 
choose to enrol a patient in a THC because there is a financial benefit, without considering 
whether the patient has a CtB. There is also a possibility that a GP could choose to not enrol 
a patient with a CtB because there is a financial disincentive. For examples of applied 
economic models that involved multiple interactions that could be strategic, we used 
examples of applied game theory models. One example is that used to explain risk sharing 
contracts between health insurers and firms.20 The key issue is the identification of “players”, 
“types” of players and strategic interactions between these types of players. 
A second limitation is that HTA models tend to assume homogeneity of the actual 
intervention, that is, the intervention will be provided in the same way to all patients. 
However, heterogeneity in the provision of DCC is an inevitable consequence of variability in 
the access to services and also variability in the capacity of GPs to respond to an 
intervention by improving the care they provide to a given patient.  
 Appendix 4 Scenarios to avoid (Detailed) 
The more detailed version of the scenarios to avoid suggest some of the risks from policy 
omissions and possible risk management strategies. 
1. Patients whose current outcomes are good and have no CtB from enrolling into an 
alternative scheme.  
In this situation, clear, unbiased and accurate advice as to whether the patient has a CtB 
from a THC pilot will improve the patient’s consent decision. Consider the situation where 
such a patient has a preference for staying within mainstream MBS rather than enrolling in a 
THC model. In this case, information about CtB could be critical to the patient’s enrolment 
decision. If the prevailing policy narrative (and possibly a standard informed consent 
process) suggests that all patients have a CtB, then the patient’s decision could be based 
on an inaccurate perception of the benefits of enrolment.  
2. Patients whose current outcomes are poor and for whom improved outcomes are 
likely to be conditional on the GP changing clinical practice. 
If some GPs are practicing in ways that time-limit their consultations, then an intervention 
that improves the opportunity to delegate appropriately to a practice nurse could improve a 
patient’s care and outcomes. However, if improved care is more clinically complex than 
existing care, then such delegation is likely to be ineffective and will instead require the GP 
to change practice by providing longer consultations. In this case for some GPs the success 
of an intervention is dependent upon these GPs’ capacity to change practice. 
3. Patients whose current outcomes are poor and who are likely to benefit from 
options other than either current care or THC, for example a multidisciplinary 
team at a Tertiary Diabetes Centre (TDC), a nurse led clinic, an IHS or a migrant 
health centre. 
For some patients, the best way to improve their care and outcomes is through a 
multidisciplinary team. A referral network is not necessarily a multidisciplinary team (MDT). 
The providers might not come together at any stage to discuss patients whose care they 
share. Some large primary care clinics have either government subsidies or the economies 
of scale to support a MDT. (For example, GP Super Clinics (public) and Camp Hill Medical 
Clinic (private)).d
                                               
d 
,21 Some MDTs service specific populations, for example, those located in 
IHSs have a  focus on providing care for Indigenous Australians. It is possible that a THC 
such as the Diabetes Pilot provides an incentive to choose between either continuing as 
usual (current care) or enrolling (a THC). There may be no reference to a third option 
outside the GP’s standard referral network. In this case, an informed consent process that 
explicates all options available to a patient will improve both the patient’s and the GPs' 
consent process.    
http://www.camphillmedical.com.au/home  (Accessed November 2011) 
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Appendix 3 Brief Profile of 18 participants in Diabetes 
Research Focus Groups 
 
DH 
DH is a white male in his early 50’s. He was diagnosed with diabetes approx. 10 years ago 
after urinating constantly at night and resultant blood tests confirmed a diagnosis of 
diabetes. 
WR 
WR is an Aboriginal man in his early 50’s. He was diagnosed 20 years ago and found out he 
had diabetes after drinking a lot of sugary drinks and woke up one morning and couldn’t 
see. 
RD  
RD is a white male in his mid 60’s. He had blood tests prior to a hip replacement 10 years 
and was diagnosed with diabetes. He was not surprised due to family history and was also 
suffering from exhaustion at the time. 
RA  
RA is a white male in his early 60’s. He had problems with vision and resultant tests showed 
he had diabetes. 
DM  
DM is an Aboriginal male in his mid 50’s. He is obese. He had high blood pressure and 
constant headaches and resultant blood tests showed diabetes. 
GW  
GW is an Aboriginal male in his late 60’s. He was diagnosed 30 years ago following regular 
blood tests. 
JW  
JW is an Aboriginal male in his early 50’s. 10 years ago he had blood tests because of 
family incidence and results showed he had diabetes.  
CG  
CG is an Aboriginal male in his late 40’s. He presented with heart issues 10 years ago and 
at the same time was diagnosed with diabetes.  
LB  
LB is a white female in her late 20’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes,  3 years after 
a series of health issues. 
KC  
KC is a white female in her early 30’s. She was diagnosed at 10 years of age; she was on 
holiday and was drinking excessively – went to toilet constantly during night and wet bed 
and was constantly exhausted. On 1 day she drank 2 litres of coke; Mother alarmed and 
admitted to hospital where she was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes. She has had medical 
procedures which are not elaborated on as they are likely to identify her. 
EB  
EB is a white female in her early 30’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes 10 years ago 
after presenting with symptoms of lethargy, sleeping a lot and drinking lots of fluids. 
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MC  
MC is a white female in her early 30’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes 20 years 
ago. MC had a virus which developed into measles and then pneumonia; she lost of lot of 
weight and diagnosis was confirmed.  
 
AD  
 
AD is an Aboriginal female in her late 60’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes after 
suffering depression and ongoing sleep apnoea. 
 
SB  
 
SB is an Aboriginal female in her late 50’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes 5 years 
ago following regular blood tests.  
 
BD  
 
BD is an Aboriginal female in her late 60’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes 30 
years ago after suffering from lethargy and excessive urination.  
 
RS  
 
RS is an Aboriginal female in her late 20’s. She was diagnosed with type 2 diabetes in 2011 
after suffering from blurry eyesight and numbness in feet; blood tests at an Aboriginal Health 
Clinic confirmed diagnosis. 
 
CB  
 
CB is an Aboriginal female in her late 50’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes in 2011 
following regular blood tests at an Aboriginal Health Clinic.  
 
NC  
 
NC is an Aboriginal female in her early 50’s. She was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes in 
2011 following regular blood tests at the Aboriginal Health Clinic. 
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Appendix 4 Summary of focus groups 
Diabetes Policy Research Project - Summary of Focus Groups 
The following provides a brief summary overview of the key issues arising from the focus groups. 
Special emphasis is placed on the issue of informed consent given the Diabetes Coordinated Care 
Program will be recruiting people to participate in the pilot program.  
 
Summary 
 
Policy 
Simulation 
Typology 
A series of Focus Groups involving 18 participants were held with the aim of 
drawing out participants experiences with diabetes - their “patient journey”. A 
number of key questions were posed including the following; 
• the range of health providers consulted to assist in management 
of their diabetes, 
• whether they were aware of health professionals consulting each 
other to monitor, plan and/or improve their health care, 
• types of support received from GP’s,  
• their opinions on whether GPs need more assistance to provide 
the best quality of care to people with diabetes, 
• financial costs of care,  
• whether they felt they could make an informed decision to join a 
pilot program on diabetes treatment based on the knowledge of 
the quality of care they were currently receiving, and 
• the information they would need to assist them in making a 
decision to join a pilot program (informed consent). 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
models 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
GP Type 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
GP Type 
Informed 
Consent 
Health providers 
 
In addition to their GP the range of health and allied health professionals 
consulted at some time by some of the people included; 
• dietitians,  
• ophthalmologists,  
• endocrinologists,  
• podiatrists,  
• cardiologists, and,  
• dermatologists.  
 
Only a small number reported they consulted with a Diabetes Educator and 
while a number saw a dietitian there was some concern expressed over their 
helpfulness in managing their diabetes. Only one participant reported that they 
saw a Practice Nurse in a GP practice, whereas in the Aboriginal Clinic everyone 
sees the Practice Nurse as they conduct blood tests, check weight and after the 
consultation with the GP they attend the chemist with a list of prescriptions and 
drop them off to peoples’ homes. 
 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
Referral 
Networks 
 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
 
 
Indigenous 
Health Service 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
Health professionals consulting each other 
 
The majority of participants reported that their GP is their care planner and other 
professionals formally report to them but from their experiences many doubted 
that there is much interaction between other professionals on care plans. One 
participant suggested that as there is competition between the professionals this 
does not assist communication and that there is a hierarchy with the 
endocrinologist sitting at the top. Another participant noted that their 
 
 
 
Allied Health 
Professionals 
(Quality and 
Quantity) 
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endocrinologist writes letters copying to all health professionals but does not 
include allied health professionals. 
 
It was also suggested that there is a disconnect between the public and private 
health system with long waiting times to see an endocrinologist in the public 
system; noting that they appear to be under huge pressure and do not have time 
to consult with other health professionals. 
 
The majority of participants suggested that there needs to be significant 
improvement in communication between all professionals they have a 
relationship with. It was also commented that there has to be a move away from 
labelling people as “diabetics” and the need to refer to people with diabetes to 
reflect they are more than their disease. 
 
The Aboriginal Health Worker from the Aboriginal Health Service on hearing 
responses from their community indicated that a role for the Aboriginal Health 
Service should be to provide more connections between patients and their 
professionals.  
 
One group agreed that the critical elements in providing care for people with 
diabetes were what they termed the 3 C’s –  
• Competence 
• Caring 
• Communication.  
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
 
GP Type 
 
Types of support received from GP’s and provision of more assistance  
 
The responses to these questions were varied. A majority indicated that the GP 
focussed on the issue at hand and may not be aware of the larger picture in 
relation to lifestyle issues because of lack of time or capacity. It was suggested 
that while some focussed on “wellness” issues others resorted to use of fear 
such as not mixing alcohol with particular drugs and diet control etc. A number of 
Aboriginal participants commented that they sometimes felt fearful and afraid 
irrespective of the messages being provided and that they sometimes suffered 
information overload. A number indicated how difficult it is to make changes to 
diet and lifestyle. 
 
A few participants commented that there was no excuse for a GP not having 
competence in the area while others said that they personally had more 
awareness of their condition because they had been living with it for a long time 
and a few indicated that there was a need for assistance to GP’s through 
referrals to other professionals.  
 
A number of participants suggested that to have diabetes can be a lonely and 
isolating experience and that even families do not understand the issues. It was 
stated that to have diabetes is a 24/7 issue. 
 
There was a general thrust that the whole notion of investing in GP’s is fraught. It 
was generally noted that GP practices do not pay enough attention to diabetes 
and the service is somewhat limited. It was suggested most GP practices are 
referral agencies and with greater access to information on the internet GP’s 
roles may not be as influential. It was suggested that an alternative approach 
would be to establish diabetes centres of excellence and even have a home 
service run through local government.  
 
 
 
 
GP Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GP Type 
Patient Type 
 
 
Patient Type 
Referral 
Networks 
 
 
 
GP Type 
 
Referral 
Networks 
Financial costs of care 
 
The majority of participants reported that the financial costs are significant. All 
 
 
Service 
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expressed the view that if people did not have sufficient financial resources they 
would be less likely to be able to achieve effective treatment.  
 
Participants referred to costs relating to purchase of medication, test kits, insulin 
pumps, the “gap” between specialists fees and health cover, loss of time and 
wages, special food (which is much more expensive than normal food lines) and 
alternative measures for treatment and management of diabetes. 
 
It was noted that people with a health care card receive reimbursement for their 
diabetes treatment and that given the significant costs associated with diabetes 
assistance should be broadened. It was also noted that once people turn 18 
assistance cuts out as though people no longer require treatment beyond 18. It 
was also noted that people may pay more for diabetes related medication than 
other medications that are on the PBS list. 
  
With respect to the Aboriginal community people are able to be registered with 
the Aboriginal Family Clinic (Aboriginal Health Service). This means that people 
are entitled to a full health assessment, followed by development of a care plan 
and eligibility for the “Closing the Gap” card which ensures they receive free 
treatment and do not incur costs for medication. However it was noted that 
neither ophthalmology costs nor dental care are covered.  
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
 
 
 
Service 
Delivery 
Models 
Indigenous 
Health Service  
Informed Consent 
 
A majority of participants felt they could make an informed decision to join a pilot 
program based on the knowledge of the quality of care they were currently 
receiving. One participant considered that informed consent would not be as 
critical for diabetes as compared with some other diseases. However, common 
sense dictated that if you are ever going to join a pilot you would receive a 
complete and thorough examination to assess your fitness to join.  
 
With respect to being asked to join a pilot program on diabetes treatment and 
the information they would want to assist them in making a decision to join the 
responses were quite comprehensive. It was noted that a person newly 
diagnosed with diabetes would most probably have different perspectives to 
people who have had diabetes for a number of years.  
 
A majority of participants readily identified the following issues as being the 
relatively straightforward issues requiring responses before joining, eg; 
• How will I benefit from the pilot? 
• Will my diabetes condition improve if I join? 
• Will my treatment improve if I join? 
• How will it affect me financially? Will I be better or worse off? 
• What if I join and part way through I decide to not continue with the pilot 
– what will happen? Will I be able to return to my previous arrangements 
without any difficulty/repercussions? 
• What if my condition deteriorates – what remedies will be available to 
me? 
 
Other more significant issues requiring attention included the following;  
 
• Overall Management 
• Clear objectives of the pilot. 
• Clear understanding of the funding and auspicing of the pilot. 
• The level of expertise of people running pilot. 
• Availability of expert advice. 
• Time required. 
• Would need to ensure that participants rights are preserved.  
The letters in 
parentheses 
relate to the 
21 elements of  
TP-QIC (see 
Appendix ?; 
adapted from 
Cohn et al, 
2011) 
 
Clinical Audit 
(H) 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical Audit 
(H) 
 
 
 
(M) 
(M) 
(M, R) 
(U) 
(T) 
 
 
(P) 
 
 
 
 
 
(J) 
(O, U, W) 
(K, M) 
(K, M) 
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• All participants expenses to be covered. 
• There would be a need for good communication and information 
provision.  
• There would need to be good management of participants’ 
conditions and be able to have access to specialists as required. 
• Control Group 
• Would have concern about the control group and would need to 
know about the non-control group and their experiences.  
• Considered it to be problematic in achieving improvement through 
one group of people who are the control group.  
• If people were on multiple medications there would need to be a 
very large cohort to disentangle all the medications being used to 
assess the effectiveness of the pilot. 
• Ethics and Methodology 
• Need to know the ethical basis of the pilot and the research design 
and methodology. 
• Needs to be clear advice on how the information collected is used. 
• Identify whether other trials are occurring and the results. 
• Clear information on data storage and use. 
• Information on the drugs involved and what side effects are known. 
• Pilot Outcomes 
• Advice on long term outcomes and how these are to be measured. 
• If pilot does not work clear understanding of the implications. 
• If there are any complications from pilot how these will be managed. 
 
In addition to the above the other concerns for Aboriginal people were; 
• Privacy issues 
• Access to interpreters if required  
• Access to transport  
• The need for other Aboriginal people to be involved in the pilot 
• Being involved in research and not getting reimbursed 
• Being afraid of the unknown 
• Being able to sign a form with all the relevant information set out in it. 
(K, N) 
(V)e
(O, U, W) 
 
(A-F and G-W) 
 
(M) 
 
 
Clinical Audit 
(H) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(J, V) 
 
 
(J, V) 
(J+)f
(V) 
 
(L) 
 
(J+) 
(N, P) 
(P, T) 
 
 
(V) 
( g
(U) 
 ) 
(H) 
(U) 
(K, L, M) 
(G) 
 
 
 
 
                                               
e‘V’ relates to confidentiality of data during pilot but might also include detail of post-pilot use in, for 
example, reports, journal publications 
f ‘J – Provides information about the reasoning behind/rationale of the new system’, but might also 
include evidence from other trials. 
gTP-QIC should reflect cultural variation either through modified form or 
translators/interpreters 
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Appendix 5 Informed consent in a strategic contest 
Strategic/non-strategic actions in obtaining informed consent in four health care contexts 
were reviewed. What can we learn from this review for patient enrolment in ‘Tailored Health 
Care’?h
Ideally, informed consent results from the participant and/or patient deciding that there is a 
‘CtB’ from an intervention, based on information that is offered by a health care 
provider.Such interactions are central to the process of obtaining consent and subsequent 
enrolment, as seen in the policy simulation. For example:  
 
• How do patients respond to GP information on their CtB in terms of enrolling or not 
• How does a GP respond to information about their own standard of care as revealed 
by the clinical audit implicit in the informed consent process 
• Would they respond differently to an explicit clinical audit of their care 
• How does GP optimism overestimate patients’ CtB 
• How do providers operate, ‘non-strategically’ and ‘strategically’, in the range of 
choice sets, which they provide to the participants and patients. 
 
The decision by the patient to provide‘Informed consent’ (IC) is a function of their 
understanding of their ‘Capacity to Benefit’ (CtB); the patient’s expectation of the most 
positive health outcome as a consequence of being presented with and receiving  the best 
available clinical option. Capacity to benefit is considered here as a function of: 
• The Quality (Q) of the intervention 
• The ‘completeness’ of the Information (I) provided by the clinician/system  
• The current Health Status (HS) of the person being asked for consent 
 
Examples from four other health care contexts were used to illuminate: what constitutes 
quality of intervention; what are the dimensions of completeness of information from the 
point of view of both clinicians and patients; how does a patient’s current perspective on 
their state of health influence their own evaluation of the CtB from an interventional change; 
and how can patients relate these parameters to their current treatment. What counts as 
quality, what should they know and what expectations can they have of both feeling and 
getting better? (The other contexts are discussed fully elsewhere.) 
 
                                               
h‘Tailored health care scheme”  is proposed as a term to describe any initiative in the Australian 
Primary Health System that is an alternative to expansion of MBS items as a strategy for addressing 
the needs of patients whose care needs are not necessarily optimally met within mainstream primary 
care. 
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Figure 1Non-strategic and strategic actions for the consideration of current and new 
treatments in relation to CTB 
As is noted above, inherent in the complexity of these interactions is the notion of 
clinician strategy
 
. Figure 1, above, outlines both non-strategic and strategic actions for the 
consideration of current and new treatments, and for providing patients with the opportunity 
to select the best available option – the CtB. 
The relation of CTB and informed consent for clinical trials, for anaesthesia, for private 
health insurance, and for screening was used to construct a model for the fifth area of IC: 
THC for the management of diabetes in general practice.  
 
 
 
New 
treatment 
Current 
treatment 
 
 
CTB = ƒ(Q x I x 
HS) 
Non-strategic: 
CP of CTB = PP of CTB (I
com
  x Q
 high
 ) 
Full disclosure of likely outcomes and risks. Both current 
& new treatments are compared 
 
Strategic (Type A): 
CP of CTB > PP of CTB (I
 incomplete 
x Q
high
 ) 
Clinician modifies input in relation to patient 
condition and requests (or not) for 
information, considering current & new 
treatment options and/or responds in 
relation to policy agendas 
Strategic (Type B): 
CP of CTB » PP of CTB (I
 min 
x Q
low
 ) 
Unethical withholding of information 
relating to context & quality of 
interventions. Likely outcomes of current 
treatment not considered. 
Consideration 
of treatment 
options for 
both patients of 
stable and poor 
health 
 
KEY: 
CP – Clinician perspective 
PP – Patient perspective 
CTB – Capacity to Benefit 
(See text for symbols in 
formula) 
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The health care contexts 
Clinical trials 
The treatment arm of a clinical trial is usually very specific in terms of the intervention(s). 
Earlier phases of the research evaluate possible side effects and information on trial 
procedures determine the duration of the study. Informed consent is given on the basis of 
information of a specific intervention with time-limited involvement. Eligible participants are 
usually chosen on the basis of a pre-existing condition, with such participants being given 
the choice of randomisation to two or more treatment options, arms of the study. The CtB in 
absolute terms is not known even though benefits of participation will be advanced. 
Anesthesia 
Informed consent for anaesthesia is precedented on the decision to elect for surgery, the 
‘treatment’ is specified, and the duration is limited. Whilst there are risks and side effects to 
anaesthesia, the short-term CtB is immediate; the long-term benefit is more likely to be 
related to the success of the surgery, which will vary in duration. Those eligible for the 
surgical procedure have previously made their choice from among treatment options based 
on a pre-existing condition; such options will likely to have evidence-based benefits. 
Informed financial consent 
Informed financial consent is made following a commitment to a policy schedule, where the 
individual may not present with a pre-existing condition. Individuals making changes to new 
health funds or policies, with a pre-existing condition will have conditional clauses imposed, 
but decisions to commit are based on the individual’s estimate of the future CtB and are 
made at a point in time. Eligibility is defined by age, medical history, lifestyle decisions and 
genetic risk factors, among others; duration of receiving benefits is unpredictable. 
Screening 
Screening is a pre-intervention; participation potentially involves making follow-up decisions 
in relation to diagnostic tests. The decision to continue or to stop the screening process can, 
in theory, be made at any point in time. In practice though, it appears difficult to refuse 
additional diagnostic tests (Ransohoff, McNaughton Collins & Fowler, 2002). Therefore, the 
first decision whether or not to undergo screening is critical. This creates a decision-gap 
between the screening and the potential diagnosis, and intervention: what counts as the 
intervention; what evidence informs the pre-intervention decision; how specific is the 
intervention; can the duration be defined; who is eligible? 
In the summary of the four contexts above, the focus is on defining parameters, which 
characterise the uncertainty inherent in complex decisions. As each case is considered in 
order, the specificity of the intervention ‘decreases’ or becomes obfuscated by the 
uncertainty surrounding the expected outcome. As a contrast, the duration of knowing the 
dénouement of the CtB increases, with eligibility called into question and dependent on the 
success of the surgery, unpredicted health events and positive test results. Furthermore, 
such complexity is dependent on the evidence base of the intervention, the health status of 
the patient and the information that is ‘strategically’ (non-strategic and strategic) included in 
any pre-intervention participant-clinician communication. 
Implicit in such participant-clinician communication is the notion of trust. Based on the 
expectations of people, as a starting point with unfamiliar practitioners, both health care, as 
an institution, and clinicians, as professionals, command, in the main, an institutional trust. 
For single-episode encounters, such expectation may be enough, where specific outcomes 
are required. Repeated interactions with the same clinicians allow the development of more 
secure expectations on the basis of past history and anticipation of future interactions 
(Tarrant, Dixon-Woods, Colman  & Stokes, 2010). Whether such trust is a ‘double-edged 
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sword’ in complex patient decision-making is unclear. Does secure trust build a reliance on, 
say, doctors’ advocacy for screening or for new management programs?   
An examination of the informed consent process may provide answers to the relationship 
between autonomy of the patient and the responsibility of the professional to see such 
autonomy as a factor in the reciprocal interactions underpinning secure trust. Furthermore, 
in a multi-professional program of associated treatments does such thing as ‘Team Trust’ 
play a role in patients’ clarity of their current care and suggested alternatives?   
Based on the above four contexts, the added complexity of informed consent in a multi-
professional program of associated treatmentsi, where the intervention is a government-
funded change in the management processes of such available treatments, is explored.  
For a proposed change in the multi-professional management of diabetes, most patients 
have a diagnosed pre-existing condition, which is being treated, although newly diagnosed 
patients may be added to the program. Here, the informed consent relates to enrolment of 
patients into the new organisational structures of the proposed program – the ‘new tailored 
health care’. Here, the expected outcomes, among others, would be: 
The management of diabetes as Tailored-health-care (THC) 
• Earlier initiation of insulin for type 2 diabetes 
• Increased co-ordination of care by: 
 Greater access to members of multi-professional team 
 Improved data collection and sharing of electronic records. 
The tool, Process and Quality of Informed Consent (P-QIC),was developed by Cohn, Jia, 
Smith, Erwin & Larson (2011) for use with clinical trials. They found that P-QIC was useful in 
both identifying strengths and weaknesses in the consent process and helping investigators 
develop and improve consent interventions. 
Table 1, below, identifies the 20 items of P-QIC. The authors in listing the 20 items in two 
categories ‘Essential element of communication’ and ‘Essential element of information’ do 
not order the items in degrees of ‘essentialness’; the current authors have posited such 
ranking in Table 1, below.P-QIC provides a non-strategic inventory of actions. Utilising the 
complete range of essential elements, both basic (minimum) and complete, in the informed 
consent process equates to non-strategic enrolment. Omission of basic essential elements 
would be unethical. 
 
                                               
i Associated treatments: Components of the type 2 diabetes guidelines include – primary prevention; 
case detection and diagnosis; patient education; blood glucose control; diagnosis, prevention, and 
management of chronic kidney disease; management of diabetic retinopathy; blood pressure and 
control; lipid control; and prevention and detection of macrovascular disease. National Evidence-
Based Guideline on Prevention, Identification and Management of Foot Complications in Diabetes 
(Part of the Guidelines on Management of Type 2 Diabetes) 2011. Melbourne Australia 
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P-QIC Items 
(with original P-QIC Order Number,Cohn et al, 2011) 
Basic 
(minimum) 
Complete 
 
Essential elements of communication   
Greets and shows interest in the participant as a person (1)   
Uses language that is easy to understand; avoids medical jargon (2)   
Stops and answers questions during the interaction; provides specific and complete 
answers to questions or concerns (17) 
  
Checks for participant understanding of information (eg, asks participants to explain the 
study in their own words) (18) 
  
Assures that the participant reads or is read aloud the consent form before signing (19)   
Offers the participant the opportunity to accept, decline, or take more time to decide 
about enrolment in the study (20) 
  
Essential elements of information   
Provides information regarding why the participant was selected for the study (3)   
Provides information about the scientific purpose of the study (4)   
Provides step-by-step information about the study procedures (5)   
Provides information about the risks, discomforts, and side effects that may occur as 
part of the study (6) 
  
Provides information about the benefits of participation (7)   
Specifies the duration of study participation (8)   
Discusses how research-related costs will be covered (9)   
Explains alternatives to participation in the study (10)   
Discusses the difference between the research study and standard treatment (11)   
Makes clear that participation is voluntary and avoids coercive pressure (12)   
Provides information about how to terminate participation (13)   
Provides information about remuneration for participation (14)   
Describes how confidentiality of the data will be maintained or protected (15)   
Provides institutional review board and investigator contact information (16)   
 
 
Table 1: Essential elements of P-QIC adapted from Cohn et al, 2011 
Ideally, to recruit patients to the new program of THC, a complete informed consent process 
would be adopted. To guide such a process, Table 1, (Essential elements of P-QIC, 
adapted from Cohn et al, 2011) has been ‘translated’ to reflect its possible use in the 
implementation of THC rather than a clinical trial, see Table 2 - ‘Translated’ essential 
elements of P-QIC (TP-QIC). 
 
 TP-QIC:‘Translated’ P-QIC Items for informed consent in general practice 
[‘New System’ means here the reformulated management system of the treatment of diabetes in 
general practice. Changes (translations) are shown in bold italics with original  
Basic 
(minimum) 
Complete 
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P-QIC Order Number, Cohn et al, 2011] 
 Essential elements of communication   
A Greets and shows interest in the patient as a person (1)   
B Uses language that is easy to understand; avoids medical jargon (2)   
C Stops and answers questions during the interaction; provides specific and complete 
answers to questions or concerns (17) 
  
D Checks for patient understanding of information (eg, asks patients to explain the 
new system in their own words) (18) 
  
E Assures that the patient reads or is read aloud the written consent form before 
signing. Any verbal consent is confirmed in writing (19) 
  
F Offers the patient the opportunity to accept, decline, or take more time to decide 
about enrolment in the new system (20) 
  
  
Essential elements of information 
  
G Provides the patient with a written consent form(new item  ; see 19, above)  
H Provides information regarding why the patient was selected for the new system (3)   
J* Provides information about the reasoning behind/rationale of the new system(4)   
K Provides step-by-step information about how the new system will proceed with all 
members of the diabetes team(5) 
  
L Reconfirms information about the risks, discomforts, and side effects that may occur 
as a result of current treatment and with all clinical treatments in the new 
system (6) 
  
M Provides information about the benefits of participation in the new system, including 
the number of clinicians in the team, the monitoring and control of diabetes, 
assessments for complications(7) 
  
N Specifies the duration of participation in the new system, including what happens 
when Government funding ends (8) 
  
O Discusses how new system-related costs will be covered by Government 
funding(9) 
  
P Explains alternatives to participation in the new scheme, reviews how current 
treatment will be affected/stay the same (10) 
  
R* Discusses the difference between treatments in the new system and current 
and/or standardj
 
 treatment (11) 
 
S Makes clear that participation is voluntary and avoids coercive pressure (12)   
T Provides information about how to terminate participation in the new system, 
ie, revertk
 
 to current/standard treatment (13) 
 
U Provides information about remuneration for participation of patients in the new 
system for patients, GPs and other members of the clinical team (14) 
  
V Describes how confidentiality of the data will be maintained or protected between 
members of the clinical team using new IT systems(15) 
  
W Provides contact information of the funding body and principal investigator of the 
evaluation team(16) 
  
                                               
jStandard treatment may relate to what is currently practiced in the surgery and/or standard as 
defined by clinical guidelines (see footnote No. 2, p13) 
kPractice needs to consider what will be standard for patients exiting from new system; will practice 
maintain two systems?  What osmosis will occur between new system and current/standard 
treatment? 
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Table 2:‘Translated’ essential elements of P-QIC (see Table 1 for comparison) for informed 
consent in relation to the management  of diabetes in general practice (adapted from Cohn 
et al, 2011) [* ‘I’ and ‘Q’ are omitted from labels as both letters are used as abbreviations earlier in the text] 
 
Figure 2, below, uses the items from TP-QIC (Table 2), above, to generate three informed 
consent forms: 
 
• Informed Consent Form A, where enrolment is based on the GP’s classification of 
eligibility
 
, might use E, F, G, H, J, K, M, N, S & V. 
• Informed Consent Form B, where enrolment is based on eligibility and bespoke 
diagnosis
 
, might use E, F, G, H, J, K, M, N, S & V PLUS A, B, C, D, L, P, R & T. 
• Informed Consent Form C, where enrolment is based on eligibility, bespoke 
diagnosis, the patient’s evaluation of both their own and the GP’s positive/negative, 
and consideration of non-participation, 
 
might use all 21 items of TP-QIC. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Relation of TP-QIC to Informed Consent Forms  
These posited informed consent forms with greater or lesser ‘essentials of communication 
and information’ are a few among many templates in the complexity of clinician-patient 
dialogues surrounding CtB. Importantly, the 21 ‘essentials’ map closely on to the issues of 
consent raised in the focus groups. Thus, in the evaluation of the new system in relation to 
enrolment, the role of the informed consent process in the provision of optimal care should 
be monitored, but, more importantly, with those patients whose care is, currently, 
suboptimal. 
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Appendix 6 Effect of optimal diabetes therapy on clinical 
end points. 
A meta analysis of intensive glucose lowering showed a 15% reduction in the risk of non 
fatal myocardial infarction (overall rate 4.6%) with no change in total mortality. Over a 
treatment period of five years, 117 to 150 patients would need to be treated to avoid one 
myocardial infarction. One severe episode of hypoglycaemia would occur for every 15 to 52 
patients. New or worsening retinopathy would be reduced by 15% (overall rate about 10%) 
while amputations were not reduced significantly (about 1% overall). Thus for a typical large 
practice with 100 patients with type 2 diabetes  the best treatment of glucose seen within a 
trial  would have a maximum effect of  preventing retinopathy in 1 patient  so it is likely within 
general practice  no measurable effect would be seen over 5 years. 
If statin treatment was increased from 50% of patients to 100% of patients in this practice 
and events decreased by 42 per 1000 people allocated to statin treatment over 5 years  
then 2 events would be prevented in this practice (Kearney 2008). 
If blood pressure control were intensified, then the risk of stroke would be reduced by 31% 
or 13% per 5 mm Hg change in systolic BP and 12% per 2.5 mm Hg reduction in diastolic 
BP (Reboldi 2011). With a stroke rate of 3.4% over 5 years then one stroke might be 
avoided in the GP population with intensive BP therapy over 5 years. Another study (and 
Cochrane meta analysis) has shown that tight control (<130 mm Hg vs 130-140 mm Hg 
systolic BP) in patients with diabetes and CVD produced no reduction in events compared 
with usual control (Cooper –deHoff 2010, Arguedas 2009). 
Thus in a general practice of 100 patients  best practice intensive treatment might reduce  
events in 1-3 people over 5 years. Thus about 1500 intervention practices and 1500 control 
practices would be required to see a significant difference in events. Thus the only risk 
markers that can be assessed without the small sample effect dominating the result are: BP, 
HbA1c and lipids. 
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Appendix 7 Model input tables 
GPs work in a range of ways. In a previous section in this report a typology of Dr. 
Comprehensive and Dr. Six Minute was identified. This typology allows a link between GP 
practice style and heterogeneity to be specified for both response to the intervention and in 
patient outcomes pre and post intervention.  
The quality of care provided by GPs can be assumed to be either constant across GPs or 
variable. Alternatively, the “gap between actual and optimal care” identified in the Primary 
Health care reform reports could be driven by: variability across patients for a given GP; by 
variability across GPs for a given type of patient; or a combination of both.  
How should this input table be completed?  
> If you believe that all GPs are of the same “type” then put 100% in either Dr. 
Comprehensive types or Dr. Six Minute Types.  
> If you believe that GP heterogeneity will not impact on current patient outcomes then 
select the same % in the two cells for the last column. Otherwise, use different 
values. 
> If you believe that all GPs always provide optimal care, then input 100% in each of 
the cells in the last column. 
> If you believe that comprehensive GPs are more likely to provide best practice care 
to patients with complex chronic disease, then select a higher proportion in the top 
right cell than the lower right cell. 
Table 2 Input table 1: GP types 
GP types  
  % of GPs in type % of CD patients who have optimal care 
Dr. Comprehensive 
50% 80% 
Dr. Six Minute 50% 50% 
 
GP response to information on own practice 
As part of the trial eligibility process, GPs will have an opportunity to reflect upon the quality 
of the clinical care they currently provide to a given patient. For some patients, improved 
quality of care could simply involve more delegation to PNs and referral to allied health 
providers. Both GPs could accommodate this.  
However, what if the increased use of longer consultations is critical to improved care and 
GPs are paid more for these longer consultations that would otherwise be the case to 
provide an incentive to increase their use. There could be a financial gain to Dr. 
Comprehensive but a financial loss to Dr. Six Minute, relative to usual practice. (See Section 
on Typologies) Will Dr. Six Minute only improve care for some, but not all patients if he or 
she works within the 6 minute constraint.  
The standard consent and trial eligibility process is assumed to require only that the patient 
has a diagnosis of diabetes and does not meet the exclusion criteria, for example, does not 
have a co-morbidity of dementia. The process of establishing patient classification, which 
requires assessment of the patient’s service needs, is assumed to occur after consent in the 
proposed models. In enhanced consent, a clinical audit that assess GP quality of care it is 
assumed to occur during the consent process. 
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How will a GP respond to information about their current quality of care? Will they improve 
care for all patients? Or will they work within the constraints of the financial opportunity cost 
of six minute medicine?  
> If you believe that the capacity to respond to information about opportunities to 
improve clinical care is equivalent across GP types, then select the same % in first 
and last row for each column  
> If you believe that a standard informed consent process will provide the same 
opportunity to improve quality of care as an enhanced consent, then enter same % in 
each column for a given row. 
> If you believe that a particular type of GP will always respond perfectly to information 
about own quality of care (improve it to best quality for all patients) then enter 100%. 
Is the implicit assumption 100% for each cell? 
Table 3 Input table 2: GP response to information about own optimality 
GP response to information about own optimality   
% who respond With standard consent With enhanced consent 
Dr. Comprehensive 50% 70% 
Dr. Six Minute 30% 50% 
 
GP optimism is a term used to describe whether a GP will tell a patient with no CtB from 
THC, or CtB more from other care models, that they have a CtB. It is referred to as optimism 
but it could also be a strategic choice by a GP to enrol patients for whom there is a financial 
benefit for the GP but not benefit to the patient.  
As part of the informed-consent/trial-eligibility process, GPs will have an opportunity to 
review the patient’s characteristics and current outcomes. The GPs will also be able to 
consider the feasibility of making the changes in practice that they would need to make for 
their more complex patients, should that GP’s care be currently suboptimal. The informed 
consent process will provide varying degrees of information about the patient’s current 
outcomes, current care, and   If a GP has a CtB financially from enrolment of a given 
patient, will they be more likely to suggest that patient has a CtB, even if this is unlikely?   Is 
the GP’s optimism about CtB strategic or simple optimism? 
 
Table 4 Input table 4: Pre intervention distribution of access to AHSs 
  Pre intervention GPs work within different GP-centric 
models of care. GPs in large clinics could 
have access to MDTs, whereas GPs in 
smaller clinics might only have access to 
networks of providers. 
 
Different models of GP-centric care have 
varying degrees of adequacy of access to 
allied health.  
 
 
 
 
GP 
only 
GP plus 
PN 
GP plus 
Network 
GP in 
a MDT 
Proportion of GPs in 
each model 20% 35% 25% 20% 
Adequacy of AH in a 
given model         
Quantity and quality 10% 20% 35% 60% 
Quantity only 50% 50% 50% 35% 
Limited 
40% 30% 15% 5% 
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Table 5 Input Table 5: Post intervention distribution of access to allied health 
  Post Intervention How does GP access to different models of 
care change as a consequence of the 
intervention?  
 
The resultant changes in quality of service 
are derived by combining this table with 
the previous table inputs. 
 
Pre 
intervention 
GP only 
GP plus 
PN 
GP plus 
Network 
GP in a 
MDT 
GP only 20% 20% 40% 20% 
GP plus PN   25% 65% 10% 
GP plus 
Network     50% 50% 
GP in a MDT       100% 
 
Table 6 Input table 6: Distribution of patient characteristics 
Type Complex 
Sensitivity to quality What is the distribution of 
characteristics across patients? 
 
Service use might vary considerably 
within these classifications. These 
classifications define capacity to 
benefit from a given model rather than   
 
The version we constructed assumes 
that all patients who are less complex 
are not sensitive to the quality of their 
care, which is assumed to meet some 
minimum because of their attendance 
at a GP clinic. 
GP quality  
(as % of 
complex) 
AH 
quantity 
(as % of 
complex) 
AH q and q 
(as % 
sensitive to 
quantity) 
Complex 25% 75% 75% 25% 
less 
complex 
75% 0 0 
0% 
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Table 7 Input Table 7: Patients decision to enrol 
Patient's 
perception of 
CTB 
If no CtB 
CtB 
 
Patient’s decision to enrol is a function of their perception of 
their own CtB and their current health status.  
 
Is a patient who is involved in a standard consent process more 
or less likely to have an accurate perception of their CtB and the 
reasons why their current outcomes are as they are, compared 
to an enhanced consent? 
 
If a GP only enrols patients for whom there is a potential CtB, is it 
more likely that they will be able to accommodate this smaller 
number of patients within their current practice constraints? 
Complex 90% 100% 
less complex 80% 100% 
 
Table 8 Input table 8: distribution of HbA1c by broad outcome type 
  
Probability 
of control 
Probability of 
7%< HbA1c 
>= 9% 
Probability of 
HbA1c > 9% 
If a patient has good outcomes generally, 
the key indicator of control could still be 
above 7%. But have good control of 
other indicators, e.g. blood pressure and 
weight. The worse their outcomes the 
lower the probability of controlled 
HbA1c. 
 
Within each of these intervals we used 
actual distributions from two data 
sources. The simulation selects randomly 
from the relevant distribution. 
Good 95% 5% 0% 
Moderate 75% 15% 10% 
Poor 20% 40% 40% 
 
 
Table 9 Input table 9: Insufficient information available on diabetes patient records 
  
Probability of insufficient 
information on patient 
If there is insufficient information available on a patient at the time of 
assessing enrolment, then this makes it more difficult to assess their 
CtB from changed care. 
 
According to a study on whether data extraction improves patient 
records and clinical outcomes, around 45% of patients with a diagnosis 
of diabetes had no record of HbA1c in that field in their records. 
 
Do all patients diagnosed with diabetes have records available that 
allows CtB to be assessed pre enrolment? 
 
If a given patient has optimal care are they more or less likely to have 
complete patient records? 
Optimal care 5% 
 
Table 10 Input table 10: max increase and decrease in HbA1c over year and max HbA1c 
Maximum 
increase 
Maximum 
decrease 
Maximum 
HbA1c 
2 2 12 
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Appendix 8: GP heterogeneity: an example 
The possibility that GPs are heterogeneous in the context of diabetes care can be illustrated 
with reference to the results from a study on an intervention designed to provide feedback to 
GPs using clinical audit and data extraction tools.23 The study included 15 practices and 69 
GPs. The authors suggested that this study showed that it was possible for the intervention 
to have a modest improvement in recording of clinical data for patients but not to result in 
clinically meaningful changes in clinical outcomes.  
At baseline, of the 3879 patients with a diagnosis of diabetes who had attended a 
participating practice in the previous 30 months: 34% had an HbA1c recorded in the 
previous 12 months and it was of ≤ 7%; and 44.5% had not had an HbA1c recorded in the 
previous 12 months. In the 12 months after the clinical audit these proportions changed to 
34.9% and 41.4% respectively. These results suggest a small reduction from 61% to 60% in 
the proportion of all diabetes patients who had an HbA1c recorded and whose HbA1c was ≤ 
7%. It also suggests that while the average clinic had 269 diabetes patients, only 142 had 
an HbA1c result recorded in the correct field in the previous 12 months.  
There are many factors that could lead to such a small effect of the intervention 
(improvement in records and quality of clinical outcomes) and such low current recording 
rates. One factor is that 40% of patients with a diagnosis of diabetes could have attended 
the clinics within the last 30 but not the last 12 months. Factors identified by the authors 
include: 
> that test results needed to be entered in specific fields rather than in the free text 
fields;  
> GPs might not have been given adequate training and the intervention might not 
have been sufficiently intense; and 
> "self-selected practices might already have had above average levels of data 
recording, especially given that nine out of the 15 practices had participated in the 
APCC program, making further improvements more difficult."  
Heterogeneity of GPs could be relevant to the interpretation of these results in the context of 
informing a Diabetes Pilot, for two reasons. First, the possibility that these clinics were 
above average in terms of data recording, suggests that there is variability across clinics in 
the community, despite similarity in MBS incentives and in access to GP desktop software. 
Second, the possibility the authors raise that the existing clinical and data recording results 
are difficult to improve upon would have different implication for policy, depending upon 
whether the there was high vs. low homogeneity of these results across GPs. For example, 
the result of 45% patients with diabetes not having an HbA1c recorded is consistent with 
both of the following situations: 
> 50% of GPs did not have a record of HbA1c for 65% of patients and 50% did not 
have a record for 15%; and 
> All GPs had no HbA1c recorded for 45% of their patients. 
The following scenarios are relevant to a policy simulation, if we assume that variability in 
GP characteristics contributes to variation in current patient outcomes. What if a patient and 
GP sit down to discuss enrolment in the Pilot and the GP observes that he or she has not 
recorded an HbA1c measure in the last year? Will there be an informed and transparent 
conversation about why a given patient’s outcomes are currently poor? What if the factors 
that limit outcomes in current care are not addressed by the intervention? Is improved 
primary care with the same GP the best option to improve outcomes for all patients?  What if 
that patient could have better care within the current system, but outside main stream 
general practice, for example in an Indigenous Health Service (IHS)? 
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Appendix 9 The ratio of diagnosed to undiagnosed cases 
of diabetes: a “known unknown”  
A 1999 Australian study, AusDiab, found that for every person with diabetes there was 
another who was not diagnosed.23 In 1999 and up to the early 2000s, the imperative to 
detect undiagnosed cases of type 2 diabetes was a dominant thread in the policy narrative. 
Incentives were introduced to improve the rate at which patients who were at risk of type 2 
diabetes were detected.24 Some groups, such as Diabetes Australia suggest that this ratio of 
one diagnosed for every undiagnosed person with diabetes still applies in 2011.25 
Whether or not the estimates of high levels of undiagnosed type 2 diabetes from the late 
1990's still stand is relevant to diabetes care policies. In 2011 there are estimated to be 
850,000 people diagnosed with type 2 diabetes in Australia, assuming 85% of all diabetes is 
type 2. This estimate is an 81% increase from 469,350 in 1999.l
> there are around 850,000 cases of type 2 diabetes which, when detected, would 
double the number of patients who need to be accommodated within primary care.  
  If the one to one ratio of 
diagnosed to undiagnosed still applied in 2011, then the following results would also apply:  
Without additional primary data of the type of the original and subsequent AusDiab study, 
hard empirical evidence as to whether this ratio has changed in the previous 6 years is not 
available. But does that mean that the original ratio should be continued to inform policy on 
primary care of diabetes; should we be planning for an additional 850,000 patients with 
newly diagnosed diabetes?  
An alternative to additional primary data is service use data. Some support for the view that 
the strategy to improve detection of cases of diabetes could be claimed to have been 
successful comes from MBS test data. Figure 1 shows the per 100,000 capita test for the 
MBS item for monitoring ongoing diabetes compared to that for diagnosis of diabetes. It 
shows that since 1995, this ratio has halved and the dramatic growth in the number of tests 
for monitoring diabetes reached a plateau in 2005. While the tests for diabetes diagnosis 
have increased on a per capita basis, it is possible that the cases of monitored diabetes 
appear to have steadied. This data suggests that the ratio of diagnosed to undiagnosed 
diabetes could be much higher than one to one. However, it is also possible that changes in 
testing practices explain this change over time, and that there is no change in the ratio of 
diagnosed to undiagnosed. 
In conclusion additional primary data from a well designed study will provide a more 
accurate estimate of this ratio than MBS service data. However, if the objective is to inform 
primary care planning policy, then the MBS service data could be more useful than an 
accurate but older estimate, particularly when policy influenced by this estimate could have 
changed the underlying structural parameters.m
                                               
lAusDiab 2000 report estimated that there were 938,700 people over 25 with diabetes, either known 
or unknown. The study also estimated  that half of these patients did not know that they had diabetes. 
This study did not use the type 1, type 2 classification, but given that at least some of these patients 
would have had type 1, this figure of 469,350 is an over-estimate and hence the growth would be 
underestimated by the figure of 81%. 
 
mEconomists refer to this as the “Lucas critique”; the limitations of using historical data to make 
predictions about policy, when that policy changes the underlying variables. While Lucas referred to 
the role of rational expectations, his result is generalisable. A neat summary of his Nobel prize 
winning critique is available on 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1995/press.html 
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Figure 2Tests for diagnosis and for established diabetes, per 100,000 capita and ratio 
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Appendix 10 Policy simulation in primary care – some 
issues for modellers 
One of the two objectives of this research project was to develop a formal method of policy 
simulation for health system policy. The five parts to this process are outlined below. In the 
case of this particular policy problem, there was no data available about the specifics of the 
proposed policy or pilot. The focus then was on understanding the implications of the known 
unknowns. 
The process is iterative: the simulation process identified new issues and wider consultation 
and further discussions within the team improved the characterisations used to structure the 
model.  
Part 1 involves characterizing patients, providers, service delivery models and the 
intervention. The specific steps are: 
> Characterise the policy narrative – what is included, what is omitted. This step 
involves research on the policy history and, most significantly, the discussion in the 
public domain. 
> Identify and characterise the players (patients, providers) and settings (service 
delivery models) that constitute diabetes care within the primary care setting. This 
step involves extensive consultation and builds on researchers' understanding and 
experience of the health care system. 
> Identify and characterise the intervention. Given the absence of public domain 
documentation of the intervention for the existing pilot, we used the general policy 
discussion to identify this.  
Part 2 involves identifying scenarios (interactions between players, settings and 
interventions) and the likely health outcomes for patients. The scenarios that should be 
discouraged and those that should be encouraged are identified.  
Part 3 involves identifying strategies that could minimise the risks of scenarios that have 
poor patient outcomes compared to alternatives, and also how to elicit informed patient 
preferences for care in situations where patient health outcomes are unlikely to be impacted 
by the intervention.  
Part 4 is the construction of a mathematical simulation (computer model). To simplify the 
analysis, we assumed that: i) GPs would only approach patients to ask for consent to enrol if 
there was no financial disincentive to that GP; and ii) that there was no systematic bias in 
the payment system against certain types of patients, for example, complex patients. 
However, the possibility that two GPs would have differential incentives to enrol a given 
patient is modelled.  
The steps in Part 4 are:  
1. For each element (patients, providers, service models) and intervention, select two or 
three key characteristics that can be used to optimally specify and hence simulate both 
heterogeneity within each of these elements and heterogeneity of response to the 
intervention. These variations within each element are referred to types. 
2. Specify the intervention in terms of how it either: 
a. Changes the distribution across variations within one type (e.g. increase the 
proportion of service models that include additional allied health providers.) 
b. Changes the way that a given variation of a type responds to a given context 
(e.g. change the proportion of care provided by a GP that is optimal quality.) 
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3. Specify a cohort of patients who are assigned characteristics and hence types 
(probabilistically). These proportions (e.g. % who are not complex, % who are sensitive 
to quality of allied health) can be changed by users of the tool.  
4. Similarly, specify a cohort of GPs with characteristics.  
5. Randomly assign GPs to patients. (More extensive models could assume different types 
of patients go to different types of GPs, for example, more complex patients tend to go to 
more comprehensive GPs). 
6. Randomly assign GP/patient combinations to service models. 
7. Specify health outcomes and allied health service use for patient/GP/service model 
outcomes. (Part of this analysis uses the distributions of HbA1c from true patient cohorts 
to assign an initial and changed HbA1c for each patient).  
8. Use this model to simulate the following: 
a. Partial and comprehensive reporting (report on all or just enrolled patients) 
b. Risk management strategies around patient consent and workforce constraints. 
The outcome of this process is a simulated “data set” of a cohort of 10,000 patients and 100 
GPs whose care and outcomes are followed for a year. The probabilistic approach allows 
the effect of small sample size for each GP to be represented. 
ENGAGING PRI MARY HEA LTH CARE 
RESEARCHERS 
Researchers from an EBM paradigm found policy simulation a difficult technique and 
tended, initially, to be very skeptical of its value. A typical response when a structural 
parameter was introduced to such a researcher is: “But there is no evidence of its value so 
how can we assume it has a value of x%?” A number of devices were developed during the 
research in order to address this issue. For example, the assumption made implicitly by the 
researcher was elicited, the plausibility that it could have a different value was established, 
and the significance and possibility of managing the risks associated with the uncertainty 
were demonstrated. A key distinction for EBM researchers was that between: i) assuming a 
parameter has a value of x%; and ii) using this value to test whether it matters if a parameter 
has a value apart from that assumed implicitly (typically 0% or 100%). 
Specification of input tables 
Input tables were specified in a way that successfully facilitated discussion about 
parameters for which there is no clear evidence of their value. In particular, complex or 
“difficult” unknown parameters were linked back to Types and then related back to their 
“structural roots”. For example, there is no good estimate of the variation across GPs in the 
quality of care that they provide to diabetes patients and how baseline quality of care would 
influence response to an intervention. From an economic perspective, this would be a useful 
estimate because it would allow the likely cost effectiveness of a policy to be estimated.  
Two approaches were adopted. In the spreadsheet model the “user” was required to enter 
the proportion of GPs who provided suboptimal care. However, this approach did not 
sufficiently differentiate the possible values of this estimate. The alternative was to define a 
GP in terms of one of two possible ‘consultative’ responses to the prevailing MBS schedule: 
Comprehensive or Six minute. This approach allowed “users” to discuss: how these GPs 
might practice; the relation to the quality of care for patients with chronic disease; and how 
this would differentiate their response to aspects of an intervention. Hence the “structural 
roots” of the difficult parameter - the proportion of GPs who provide suboptimal care - were 
identified.  
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Assumptions of existing initiatives 
Assumptions underlying existing initiatives were incorporated in the input tables. This 
illustrated to users, even though there might be an unwillingness to make explicit 
assumptions about a particular parameter, that there might be implicit assumptions about 
parameters underlying current policy initiatives. For example, does the prevailing policy 
agenda assume, implicitly, that all GPs have the same incentive to take up clinical decision 
support software for complex patients? Such an implicit assumption is inconsistent with the 
view that that Dr. Six Minute types would be less likely, compared to Dr Comprehensive 
types, to adopt such software because there is a financial disincentive to extend their 
consultation time. Even if users are not comfortable with making assumptions about the 
value of a given parameter, alternatives, which accord with their tacit knowledge of health 
care processes, may be preferable. 
Scenarios: interactions between patients, GP type and setting of care  
Scenarios were generated through focus groups and discussions within the research team. 
These scenarios captured sufficient heterogeneity, in the characteristics of GPs, patients 
and service delivery models, to allow risk management strategies to be identified, without 
specifying estimates of these relevant parameters. It was not necessary to have evidence of 
the proportion of patients who had no CtB in order for discussions relating to implications; it 
was sufficient to gain agreement that this proportion was greater than 0%.  
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Appendix 11 Do all Australian GPs do 14 minute medicine 
(on average)? 
In Australia, there have been (informal) claims that some general practitioners (GPs) have 
an imperative to see patients within a 6 minute window. This rationale for this claim is 
usually that the financial incentives inherent in the Medicare item structure.(1) A GP can 
earn a higher hourly income with 8 short consultations  in an hour compared to 4 longer 
consultations, where all these consultations are charged as Item 23s. 
Short consultations have a role in efficient delivery of primary health care, however there is 
evidence that for some patients, longer consultation times tend to be associated with 
increased medical interventions, fewer prescriptions, greater patient enablement and 
heightened patient satisfaction. The end result is better patient outcomes, particularly for 
patients with chronic conditions .(2) Evidence also suggests that longer consultation times 
lead to less return visits and reduced doctor stress.(2)  
Other evidence suggests that the mean consultation time for Australian GPs is around 14 
minutes, which is well in excess of 6 minutes. Britt et al (3) reported a mean consultation 
time of 14.8 minutes with an associated range of 1 minute to 106 minutes. She also found a 
high level of variation in mean consultation length per GP (mean of means 14.8 minutes, 
range 3-39 minutes). (3)  
Research suggests that level B consultation times are statistically significantly longer among 
female GPs (mean 13.7 minutes, 95% CI 13.3-14.0 minutes) than male GPs (12.7 minutes, 
95% CI 12.5-12.9 minutes)(3). Such differences are partly attributable to the treatment of 
different medical conditions, as female GPs treat more psychosocial, endocrine and female-
specific health complaints.(4)  
 More significantly, Britt et al found that there is variability in consultation time that can be 
attributed to the characteristics of GPs rather than the characteristics of the patient or the 
needs at a consultation. Longer consultation lengths have been shown to be associated with 
older age,(2, 5)  holistic orientation,(2) FRACGP qualification,(5) graduating in Australia (5) 
and rural practice.(5)  Characteristics such as these may be used to describe different types 
of GPs practicing in Australia.  
In the UK, Howie and Porter (6) defined three different types of GPs: slower GPs (median 
consultation times of 9 minutes of more), intermediate GPs (consultation times of  median 7-
8.99 minutes) and faster GPs ( median consultation times of 6.99 minutes or less). Of the 85 
GPs who participated in the study, 28% were described as faster, 47% as intermediate and 
25% as slower. Consultation length distributions for the faster and slower GPs are shown in 
the Figure. These distributions highlight the heterogeneity in GP consultation lengths in the 
UK.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of consultation lengths for (a) faster GPs (n = 6858 consultations) and 
(b) slower GPs (n = 4460 consultations)(6) 
 
The UK evidence provided further support to for defining different types of GPs within the 
Australian health care system. However, no equivalent study has been performed in 
Australia. But we can use data on GP service mix to support the plausibility that GPs vary in 
their mean consultation length. The Medicare Australia data was downloaded for seven 
different Divisions of GP and Australia. Figure 2 represents ratios of item 23 to 36 and item 
23 to the group of items in A15 (care planning). It shows variability in this ratio across GPs, 
with Flinders, a rural SA division having the highest ratio of item 23 to either item. Variability 
across Divisions is caused by variability across GPs and hence it is plausible to assume that 
GPs can be represented as having a multi-modal distribution of mean consultation time.  
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Figure 2: Ratio of item 23 to item 36 and item 23 to A15  (services) for 7 divisions of GP and 
Australia 
 
Figure 3 represents item 23, item 36 and group of items A15 as a proportion of total services 
in each division. The variability across Divisions is illustrated. 
 
 
Figure 3: Proportion of total GP services that are item 23, item 36 or A15 (Care planning) for 
7 divisions of GP and Australia 
It is also worth noting that patient factors may impact upon GP consultation times. Patient 
factors associated with longer consultation times include older age, higher socioeconomic 
status, new to medical practice, more reasons for consultation, more health problems, social 
problems, psychological problems, female genital problems, chronic disease and receipt of 
clinical treatments. Conversely, patient factors associated with shorter consultation times 
include female gender and lack of a health concession card.(5) Patient factors such as 
these may also explain some of the observed variation in GP consultation times.  
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Appendix 12 Validation of the policy simulation 
An empirical value of a parameter is not the objective of this research, hence it is not 
possible to assess the validity of the method by which a specific empirical evidence is 
achieved. For example, we do not know what proportion of GPs practice “short” rather than 
comprehensive consultations. Instead, the objective of the research is simply to identify that 
it is plausible that this variability exists and that it could be a factor that could influence 
patient CtB for enrolment. Furthermore, by definition, we cannot test whether all “unknown 
unknowns” have been identified. It is reasonable to argue that another group of researchers 
could have applied the same method and ended up with a different set of “known unknowns” 
and associated strategies. In this case, if the decision makers  were willing to engage in the 
process of policy simulation, more specific gaps could have been identified. However, this is 
an argument for a wider application of this method, rather than of its limited validity.  
But there are at least three tests of validity that can be applied.  
THREE VALIDATION TESTS 
The first test is simply that the process was able to identify “known unknowns” and also 
identify the implied valued of these structural parameters, when an estimate was not 
available. For example, heterogeneity of GPs’ current practice and capacity to change 
practice was not part of the policy narrative, and was identified as a “known unknown”. The 
implied values of the parameters around the distribution of current GP practice were 
identified; homogeneity, all GPs have the same underlying distribution of long and short 
consultations and hence can be expected to respond uniformly to the initiative. And a 
plausible alternative assumption was identified; GPs could be characterized as those who 
practice predominately short rather than long consultations. And finally, the possibility that 
two patients with the same characteristics could have a different CtB from the initiative, 
depending upon the characteristics of their GP, was identified.  
The second test is that the process was able to identify risks and associated risk 
management strategies. Policy simulation can identify that an alternative scenario regarding 
a known unknown is plausible, that is the probability is greater than 0%. What policy 
simulation cannot identify is the probability associated with a risk.  
The third test of validation is predictions that can be made from the research. In this case, 
three predictions are made. The first is that the DCC pilot will involve a patient consent 
process that does not addresses patient’s CtB from changed practice, realistically. It will also 
not include a discussion or identification of issues concerning the requirement for GPs to 
change their practice and the issue of why a GP cannot change practice in the current 
system of care. The second is that given the level of optimism regarding patient CtB, the 
DCC Pilot will be under powered (in terms of duration and patient numbers) to detect any 
change in hard endpoints such as hospital admissions, strokes and MIs. The third is that the 
focus will be on identification of heterogeneity of the costs and service bundles across 
patients (classification for capitation) rather than heterogeneity of patient to benefit from the 
intervention and heterogeneity of GPs capacity to respond to the intervention. 
In summary, validation of policy simulation is in its capacity to identify the gaps in the policy 
narrative and strategies to minimise the associated risks. It is not about generating empirical 
predictions about uptake or effect. Nor is it about finding the best estimate for a given 
parameter.  
  
 
